

# War of Resistance

## Designer's Notes

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By Mark Royer  
with Arthur E. Goodwin on the Japanese OB

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### Introduction

*War of Resistance* is part of Game Research/Design's *Glory* games series. *Glory* covers World War II in the Pacific and Asia and is a companion game series to *Europa*. The *Glory* game system mechanics are derived directly from *Europa* with time, distance, and unit strength scales being compatible. In addition *War of Resistance* includes a number of special rules to cover the specific conditions in China.

The name *War of Resistance* is chosen as it is the manner by which the Chinese refer to that conflict which, starting in 1937 and eventually merging with the global world war, ended in 1945.

I have made every effort to minimize the quantity of special rules in *War of Resistance*. However, as with every *Glory* and *Europa* game, a number of special rules are essential to depict the peculiarities of the conflict being covered. In the case of China, the major non-standard additions are the guerrilla, Chinese faction, and puppet rules. The political quagmire that is the backdrop of all military activity in China demanded a number of special rules considerations.

The following is a synopsis of rules that are special to China and a rationale for their design.

### Rules

**Rule 3A3. Basic Game Concepts / Units / Regimental Equivalents.** In general, *Europa/Glory* has presented divisions as 3 RE with rare deviation. The RE size of a division is due more to the supporting arms and ancillary equipment of the division than to the actual number of men enlisted. However, the early-war Japanese square division is almost a corps in

structure and their component brigades essentially small divisions. Therefore, I felt that it is appropriate that the RE sizes of these units be increased accordingly.

Similarly, the Chinese provincial divisions are so undermanned and have virtually no supporting arms or ancillary equipment that they hardly deserve the designation of division. Therefore I have reduced their RE sizes accordingly.

**Rule 3A5. Basic Game Concepts / Units / Japanese Square Divisions.** As noted above, the early-war Japanese square division is almost a corps in structure and their component brigades essentially small divisions that often operated independently. For a while, I considered depicting the Japanese brigades as division groups (with the [XX] symbol) and not showing the square divisions at all. However, I finally decided to show them using their historical size designations and provide special breakdown, ZOC and other rules to depict their large nature. This proved more satisfying (to me, at least) and also gave the Japanese a greater capacity to mass strength in a hex, which is necessary in certain game situations.

**Rule 3F. Basic Game Concepts / Isolation.** After a long bout of indecision regarding how to implement isolation in China, I ultimately settled on the standard *Europa/Glory* rule with a special exception clause for Communists and guerrillas. Since Communist and guerrilla formations tended to operate autonomously, and often deep behind enemy lines, they required special conditions and I linked their isolation status into the rest of the guerrilla rules.

**Rule 5. Zones of Control.** The Japanese organic and independent brigades were very large units with a significant supporting arm. As noted above, they were virtually small divisions in their own right. Thus, to give them added punch over typical brigades, I have allowed them a reduced ZOC.

Conversely, the unsupported Chinese provincial divisions have very little capability to exert a ZOC, hence the reduced ZOC for unsupported divisions. Early in the playtesting, I gave the Chinese provincial divisions no ZOC at all, but time and again the Japanese rolled over Chinese defenses too easily. The reduced ZOC seems like a good compromise.

**Rule 6A. Movement / Administrative Movement.** The absolute lack of infrastructure in rural China, which is by far the bulk of China, compelled me to disallow administrative movement except on established roads. This has worked out well and I believe is the proper representation of the effect.

I have seen numerous aerial photographs of Chinese villages that are surrounded by rice paddies and have absolutely no access road. Captions often note that inhabitants of villages like these

often never travel more than a few miles from their home village throughout their entire life. Other photos have shown roads and rail beds fading and disappearing into crop lands. From year to year, if a road is not protected and maintained, farmers will literally sow it. Last years maps are often of little value this year.

**Rule 6E. Movement / Infiltration Movement.** In order to allow the Chinese Communist an ability to penetrate Japanese lines, I devised the concept of infiltration movement. This rule abstractly represents a seeping of Communist political thought into remote areas behind enemy lines as much as it does a military maneuver. However, the latter is also a significant part of the process, as units of the 8<sup>th</sup> Route Army (the Communist army) would melt into the countryside and carry the Communist message to new regions.

**Rule 7A. Transportation Lines / Railroads.** The Chinese railroad system was in the process of modernization when hostilities broke out in 1937. During the war years, each side laid thousands of miles of new rail tracks. I allow the players to construct both historically built rails and other lines that were surveyed and never built or were built long after the war.

The provincial government built the narrow gauge Tungpu rail line in Shansi. It had just opened for use when the Japanese attacked, and it was never used at full capacity.

The following paragraphs outline my algorithm for determining Chinese rail capacity in terms of rail marshalling yards.

- 1) I identified the number of potential Chinese rail marshalling yards by date (Table 1). Potential yards are all full, partial, and dot cities located on the Chinese rail net and owned by the Chinese on the indicated date.
- 2) I averaged the number of potential rail marshalling yards over time periods (Table 2). This is simply the average of the number of historically Chinese-owned rail marshalling yards at the start and end of the time period (from Table 1).
- 3) I found the actual historical rail usage in terms of number of people and tons of supply transported (Table 3).
- 4) I made the following assumptions:  
 $1 \text{ RE people} = 9000 \text{ people} / 2 \text{ wk. turn}$  (Note 1)  
 $1 \text{ RE supply} = 2240 \text{ Tons} / 2 \text{ wk. turn}$  (Note 2)  
*Effective military rail usage ratio: 25% (Note 3)*
- 5) I calculated the REs of cargo carried in a time period from the historical cargo transported (Table 3).  
*E.g., For Jul-Dec 37 (12 turns)*  
 $25\% \times (4.47 \text{ mil people} / 9000 \text{ people/RE}) / 12 \text{ turns} = 10.3 \text{ RE/turn}$   
 $25\% \times (1.24 \text{ mil tons} / 2240 \text{ tons/RE}) / 12 \text{ turns} = 11.5 \text{ RE/turn}$
- 6) Choosing rail marshalling yard capacities of 2 for full city hexes and 1 for partial city hexes (and none for dot cities) yields total rail net capacities for each time period that very closely approximate the actual quantities transported historically as shown in Table 5.

Date	Full	Partial	Dot
30 Jun 37	12	20	10
31 Dec 37	7	10	5
30 Jun 38	5	10	3
31 Dec 38	2	1	3
31 Dec 39	2	0	3

Date	Full	Partial	Dot
Jul-Dec 37	9.5	15.0	7.5
Jan-Jun 38	6.0	10.0	4.0
Jul-Dec 38	3.5	4.5	3.0
1939	2.0	0.5	3.0

Dates	People (millions)	Cargo (million tons)
Jul-Dec 37	4.47	1.24
Jan-Jun 38	4.34	1.15
Jul-Dec 38	2.65	0.49
1939	2.82	0.36

Dates	People	Cargo	Total
Jul-Dec 37	10.3	11.5	30.1
Jan-Jun 38	10.0	10.7	20.7
Jul-Dec 38	6.1	4.6	10.7
1939	6.6	3.3	9.9

Dates	Average for time period	
	REs (Historical)	REs (Game)
Jul-Dec 37	30.1	34.0
Jan-Jun 38	20.7	22.0
Jul-Dec 38	10.7	11.5
1939	9.9	4.5

*Note 1:* A typical military RE in *Glory/Europa* terms is about 1000 to 3000 soldiers. However, since at least 75% of the historical passengers in the data were civilian (and thus require much less space per passenger due to no equipment and ammunition), I tripled the ratio to 9000 / RE.

*Note 2:* 120 tons per day is often quoted as the number of tons of supply required to supply one division (3 REs) with general (not attack) supply for one day. Thus:

$$120 \text{ tons/day} \times 14 \text{ days/turn} / 3 \text{ REs} = 560 \text{ tons/RE/turn}$$

Since one general supply point is itself \_ RE, then 560 tons is equivalent to \_ RE and therefore 2240 tons of supply requires about 1 RE of transport capacity.

*Note 3:* While the military tried to exercise better control of the rail lines, especially near the battle zones, countless narratives depict the throngs of refugees packing rail cars far beyond capacity. Several accounts detail skirmishes between military personnel and civilians over space on rail cars. I've found a single reference for a single year indicating that approximately 25% of the rail capacity used in China for that year was used for military purposes. Therefore, lacking any other hard data, I latched onto and used this number.

**Rule 7A5a. Transportation Lines / Railroads / Rail Nets / Rail Net Segments.** I deviated from the standard *Europa/Glory* regarding severed rail nets and created the concept of the rail net segment. I felt that this was particularly important in China since the scarcity of rail lines produces a number of critical rail choke points. When major portions of the rail net are severed from one another, it becomes very significant to keep track of how much rail capacity each portion of the rail net has. To allow use of all rail capacity on any rail segment allows for ahistoric flexibility.

**Rule 11. Support.** I picked up the concept of the unsupported division from *For Whom the Bell Tolls*. The bulk of the provincial Chinese armies, as well as the Communist's Red Army, had virtually no supporting arms. This deficiency went much deeper than just artillery and included a lack of logistical, communications, medical, and just about any other type of infrastructure one normally associates with a modern army. Thus, these units are unsupported divisions. Further, I slightly modified the rule as it appears in *For Whom the Bell Tolls* by giving unsupported divisions a reduced ZOC (rather than a normal ZOC).

**Rule 12. Supply.** Two elements controlled the armies involved in Sino-Japanese Conflict, supply difficulties and the political backdrop. The immediate effectiveness of the fighting units was, of course, directly dependent upon the logistic systems of the nations involved.

Japan's initial drive into China didn't suffer substantially from supply problems since the supply lines were short and the infrastructure in the regions being fought over reasonable. This changed as the Japanese drove deeper into the Chinese hinterland. Movement along and protection of supply and communication routes became of paramount importance, particularly in the face of increasing guerrilla activity. Eventually, it was the inability to protect their supply lines and get supplies to front line troops that caused the Japanese to bog down. As the war dragged on, many Japanese military operations were little more than massive foraging expeditions.

The Chinese supply situation was debilitating to the effectiveness of their military operations. Moreover, as the war progressed, the various authorities in China, and the KMT itself, became increasingly corrupt, and the distribution of supply and equipment became more of a political activity than a military activity. "Under combat conditions the Chinese soldier was weak from hunger and exhaustion. He was night-blind from deficiencies in his diet - no meat, almost no fats, few vegetables, and no sugar. He was badly clothed, often nearly in rags."

"Large quantities of small arms ammunition were wasted by poorly fed soldiers who removed bullets from cartridge cases to satisfy their craving for salt with the taste of gunpowder." "On his first contact with the Chinese army in the field, a shocked American officer referred to what he saw as a 'goddam medieval mob' - a not too inaccurate description." "The [Chinese] soldier knew from bitter experience that his own people scorned his lot, hated him for foraging to provide himself with the barest necessities, and despised him as a member of the lowest stratum of society, for Confucius had pronounced that good iron went into plowshares, poor iron into swords and spears."

Thus, I choose to use the step of attack supply system (as used in the *War in the Desert* and *For Whom the Bell Tolls*). This system correctly shows the increasing difficulty of getting supplies to the front lines as the lines of communication are stretched. It also allows me to severely limit the total volume of supply available to the Chinese player. Note that since almost all railroads in China are low volume, the Japanese player soon loses the ability to draw supply from his full supply sources. Moreover, it forces the Japanese player to huddle around the principle avenues of supply as was the historical case.

The supply rules were perhaps the most difficult rules to wrangle into place for *War of Resistance*. They at once needed to be *Europa/Glory* compliant and yet be playable. Many of the early playtests were efforts in supply management and quickly bogged down into the mundane. The final version of the supply rules still require a substantial effort (which is not unreasonable given the difficulty that the armies in China faced in supplying their forces). However, I believe that the complexity has been reduced to the point where it does not impinge on the enjoyment of playing the military aspects of the game.

**Rule 12B. Supply / Tracing Supply.** I reduced the length of the overland and road supply line elements from standard *Europa/Glory* to reflect the absolute lack of infrastructure in China. Moreover, the agrarian Chinese countryside can be even more inhibiting to a logistical system than its natural counterpart. For example, rice paddies and the various irrigation systems used extensively throughout China are logistics nightmares.

**Rule 12C. Supply / General Supply Sources.** To reflect Chinese supply problems, I don't allow the Chinese any full general supply sources. To model the distribution of supplies that they did have, and the scavenging of supplies from the countryside, I used created the concept of a Limited General Supply Net. The Limited General Supply Net is a compromise between the "look and feel" of a standard *Europa/Glory* supply system and playability. With no full supply sources, in early versions of *War of Resistance*, Chinese players were reduced to shuffling scads of general supply points (generated each turn at limited supply sources) about the map. The general flavor, while adhering to standard *Europa/Glory*, was cumbersome in its application to China.

The quantity of general supply yielded by each type of city (limited general supply source) is purely arbitrary and based loosely on previous *Europa* games. I have no solid data to determine "historical" quantities. I suspect that this data is not available, since much of this type of supply in China was acquired through illicit means such as plunder. The numbers

used in *War of Resistance* have been determined from years of playtest and balancing and appear to provide the historically proper effect (or at least my interpretation of the proper historical effect).

In summary, I wanted the supply system to feel distinctly *Europa/Glory*, and yet avoid being overly awkward or complex.

**Rule 12E. Supply / Supply Effects.** For gaming simplicity I have abandoned the standard *Europa* supply effects system that counts number of turns out of supply.

Under the standard rule, all Chinese units would always be U-4. The Japanese player, on the other hand, must begin counting the number of turns out of supply for every unit on every turn once he has out-distanced his regular supply lines beyond the low-volume rail supply line element length of 7 hexes. This quickly becomes unacceptably cumbersome.

So, for playability purposes, I simplified the supply effects rules (along the lines of *Balkan Front*; i.e., halved immediately upon being out of supply).

The effects of isolation are wrapped in to the fold by simply halving unit strengths yet again. In addition to being simple, this mechanism has the added benefit of simulating the immediate lack of resistance often put forth by Chinese units (and particularly provincial units) once cut off from the main front. Although not necessarily appropriate for Japanese forces.

The standard (*Second Front* style) *Europa* supply effects system should work in China if players are willing to invest the added effort required. If one does this, I would also ignore the clause that halves again isolated, unsupplied units.

**Rule 12I. Supply / Chinese Supply Difficulties.** The warlord and provincial armies were seldom well behaved and rarely acted in unison. This rule reflects their propensity to waste supply without regard for the overall tactical and strategic situation. The Chinese player must invest a substantial amount of effort just controlling his supply system.

**Rule 12J. Supply / Foreign Aid / General Imports.**

After the outbreak of the conflict in 1937, It was the Soviet Union that quickly provided aid China. The Soviet Union had a vested interest in seeing the Japanese bogged down in an unending stalemate in China. China, Soviet leaders felt, was an easy way to enlist some 200 low quality divisions to help protect the Siberian frontier by siphoning of the bulk of Japanese units into the Chinese quagmire.

Since Soviet leaders did not need to build domestic consensus or observe the legal trappings of international treaties, the Soviet military aid was forthcoming within a couple of months of the start of the war. By 1938, 60 thousand tons of supplies and war materials were leaving Odessa every month bound for Chinese ports. The ancient silk caravan routes that crossed Soviet territory from China to the middle east were employed to carry all sorts of Soviet equipment (tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft parts, etc...). The Japanese claimed that the Soviets were sending nearly 80 aircraft per month to the Chinese by early 1938. The Soviet air units that appear in *War of Resistance* were shipped to China complete with "volunteer" pilots. The Japanese were quite distressed when they first downed a plane to find a Soviet pilot emerge.

The fact that almost none of the Soviet aid made its way into Chinese Communist hands was the seed of great fissures that

developed between the two parties in later years. Soviet leaders, rightly I think, assessed that in 1937 the Nationalists were the only power in China capable of embroiling the Japanese in a protracted conflict. Although its not clear, the Soviet Union may have played a significant role in the formation of the "united front" which joined the Communists and Nationalists in a tenuous alliance against the Japanese in the early war period.

Western nations, quick with rhetorical condemnation of Japan, were far less helpful when it came to tangible aid until after Pearl Harbor. A minor monetary grant was tendered by the U.S. in 1939 and some more substantial grants followed in the early 1940s. One of the more significant supporting actions by the U.S. was the extension of the early 1930's silver purchase policy to China during the war. This allowed the Chinese to remain financially solvent and forestalled the near collapse of the Chinese monetary system for half a decade. Hard military equipment aid was virtually non-existent until after the American entry into the war. The AVG ("flying tigers"), formed mid to late 1941, were purely voluntary and had no official U.S. sanction (although evidence to the contrary has surfaced). The Chinese had to purchase their 100 P-40B planes from U.S. surpluses which had been destined for but cancelled by Britain since they were obsolete by European standards.

Britain and France had all they could handle with Germany and simply could not afford to send significant quantities of aid to China at this time. Moreover, Britain in particular, was disinterested in the Chinese war effort and believed that the Chinese could not contribute substantially to the war effort from a global point of view. Some minor token loans were tendered by the British and the French underwrote the construction and improvement of a rail line to French Indo-China.

**Rule 14E. Special Ground Units / Fortress Units.** Allowing fortress units to be supported only if they occupy a fortress hex is a mechanism to show the effects of the essentially immobile, ancient artillery affixed to the fortresses.

**Rule 14F. Special Ground Units / Guerrillas.** The war in China started as a conventional war with two conventional armies squaring off against one another. As the Japanese quickly demonstrated their clear dominance in this endeavor, the Chinese searched for alternative ways to combat the enemy.

The concept of guerrilla warfare had been used by the Communists to defend their strongholds against the Nationalist's Central Army in the early to mid 1930's. Thus, it became a natural metamorphosis for the Chinese armies, and particularly the Communists, to convert to the familiar guerrilla warfare techniques against the Japanese.

Both the Communists and Nationalists employed guerrilla units and converted conventional army units to guerrillas. By far, the Communists were more effective in promulgating the guerrilla war, owing in large part to Communist popularity among the rural peasants (particularly in North China).

The guerrilla rule, combined with Rule 39 Guerrilla Bases, shows the ability of these non-conventional units to move quickly through difficult terrain, infiltrate behind enemy lines, strike suddenly at targets that are not well defended, and evaporate back into the wilderness.

The guerrilla's value is more due to its nuisance factor than its combat abilities. With guerrilla units, the Chinese player can

cut supply and communication lines deep behind the Japanese player's front forcing him to siphon off valuable combat units from the action to perform rear guard duties.

**Rule 14G. Special Ground Units / Japanese Reserve Divisions.** The early war Japanese square division was a very large organization, nearly a corps by European standards. Organic to the divisional structure was a complete reserve unit. This unit was generally composed of second line troops (older men who were not on active duty, but called up for the war). Though its primary function was to keep the combat strength of the division at or near full strength despite combat losses, local commanders often used their reserve units for occupational duties and even at times for combat.

The Japanese reserve division rule allows the Japanese player to duplicate his historical counterparts in this regard.

**Rule 15. Breakdowns.** The Japanese square division requires a unique breakdown structure to allow the Japanese player to simulate the historical employment of these units. The Japanese player can operate this division as separate brigades, as separate regiments, or even as separate battalions, as the situation requirements dictate. Moreover, each 9-11-6 square division has an 8-10-6 form, that is brought into play by extracting its line of communications brigade (as specified in the Japanese OB) for independent operations. This allows the Japanese player a nominal occupation capability while maintaining a complete division in play.

In the game, the Japanese player generally finds that he has too few units to cover all of the conquered territory against the menacing guerrillas and ends up stretching long strings of battalions to cover his lines of supply.

**Rule 20G1c & 20G2i Air Missions / Bombing / Terror Bombing.** In the event, the Japanese tended to behave far more ferociously, commit many more atrocities, and engage in non-military related bombings, if a Chinese city were vigorously defended. Thus, Chinese leaders were placed in the precarious position of deciding whether or not to defend a city knowing that the civilian population would suffer immensely before and after occupation. Linking terror bombing effects to defended cities only, attempts to simulate this ignoble aspect of the war.

**Rule 21D. Air Combat / Fighter Pilot Superiority.** Source after source indicates the clear superiority of Japanese naval (IJN) fighter pilots over their army (IJA) counterparts. They were better trained, disciplined and equipped. Chinese pilots, for the most part, were inadequate for the mission of defending China. Therefore, I implemented a tiered superiority system to show the dramatic variance in quality with the IJN pilots at the top (equivalent to Western European fighter pilots), followed by IJA and Soviet pilots and with Chinese pilots at the bottom.

**Rule 23C. Special Air Rules / Extended Range.** Very few Japanese fighters, and no Chinese fighters, were equipped with drop tanks at this early date. In fact, as the Japanese player will note, he has no fighters with extended range capability at the outset of the conflict. The "Claude" (A5M2) was the first aircraft to use drop tanks in combat situation.

**Rule 27-35. Naval Rules.** The naval rules are derived from *Second Front*, with river flotilla/river transport rules overlaid. However, the *Second Front* naval system is far too complex for this game and so the *War of Resistance* system has been

dramatically simplified. However, the general elements of the *Second Front* system are maintained for compatibility with the remainder of the *Europa/Glory* game series. Although I haven't tried it, it should be possible to use the full blown *Second Front* naval system in *War of Resistance*.

I changed task forces' (TF) naval gunnery strength when used in the ground support role (NGS) while on a river to siege artillery, instead of field artillery (which is standard in *Europa*). I allow the effect only on a river since this is the only time that the gunfire is stable enough to qualify; firing from the ocean is simply not as effective. Since TFs are very limited in terms of river movement, this ruling will not have broad sweeping effect. For the purposes of *War of Resistance*, this ruling shows the correct effect for the unique case of Japanese supporting naval gunfire in Shanghai (in 1937). Shanghai simply doesn't fall in an historical time frame unless the guns are considered siege artillery. Source after narrative source speaks to the devastation that the Japanese naval guns wrought upon Shanghai from their moorings in the Whangpoo River.

**Rule 36. Weather.** *War of Resistance*, of course, uses the *Glory* standard weather system that includes a number of new and interesting weather conditions as compared to *Europa*.

**Rule 36F. Weather / Floods.** Of unique note in China is the summer flooding of Central China. This is the flooding that is the impetus for the modern day 3-gorges damming effort to control the water flow. Much of the river region of Central China, and particularly the Yangtzé River basin floods annually. This is a major problem in low-lying regions and severe flooding can result in extensive famine. From a military point of view, it is essentially a given that the rivers will be flooded sufficiently to effect operations.

**Rule 37A1. Special Rules / The Great Wall.** The modern combat effectiveness of the great wall is a matter of debate, but its perceived value by military commanders of the time probably outweighed its actual value. Chinese units often anchored their defensive lines along the great wall. Thus, to simulate the perceived value and thereby simulate the historical use of the great wall, I give it a small possibly to affect combat results. This is not completely arbitrary, as the condition of the great wall varies widely from place to place. Military commanders could never be exactly sure as to how well forces might be able to employ a particular stretch of the wall for defensive purposes.

**Rule 37B4. Special Rules / Holding Boxes / Burma Road Holding Box.** One of the more amazing engineering feats accomplished in the China Theater was the construction and maintenance of the Burma Road. This thread of a lifeline became one of the only connections the Chinese had with the outside world. It ran from Kunming in the southwestern province of Yunnan to Mandalay in Burma.

In July 1940, as they stood alone against the German aggressor, Britain closed the Burma Road in the face of Japanese pressure. As the German threat of a cross channel invasion of England abated later in the year, the British re-opened the Burma Road. This event widened the already suspicious rift between the Chinese and the British.

**Rule 37D1a. Special Rules / Garrisons / Chinese Garrisons / West China.** This garrison depicts forces required for the occupation of the Chinese far western hinterlands. A

number of rebellious groups and governments occupied this region including Tibet and Sikiang.

**Rule 37D1b. Special Rules / Chinese Garrisons / Southern Shensi.** To the detriment of the Chinese war effort in general and to the chagrin of western advisors (particularly later in the war) the Chinese Nationalists maintained a significant garrison to blockade and prevent a southward Communist infiltration from their northern bases into the heartland of Nationalist China. The garrison was rather modest in the early years, but was increased dramatically as the war progressed. Most of the garrison expansion occurred during the years from 1941 to 1945 and thus is not shown by this rule. This rule will fall apart after 1941 and not be sufficient to depict the actual garrison requirements in the later war years. However, it is sufficient for purposes of *War of Resistance*.

**Rule 37D1c. Special Rules / Chinese Garrisons / Major and Dot Cities.** The local warlords and provincial leaders, while generally cooperating with the central government, were far from completely loyal or completely subservient. When requested to send forth their army, they usually did so in part only, keeping a substantial garrison to protect their own cities and "borders." This garrison rule requires the Chinese player to adhere to the historical realities. Many of the forces retained in garrison fall below the scale depicted by *War of Resistance*. Typically they might rate as 0-3 Police, Security, and Border units and would have been used to garrison provincial border crossings and maintain internal provincial security in general. (And no... they don't even rate highly enough to warrant an effect against Japanese overruns; thus they don't deserve to be shown by counters and are ignored for game purposes.)

**Rule 37E. Special Rules / Factories.** Immediately following the outbreak of hostilities, the Chinese government embarked on a massive program of moving industry from the industrial lowlands, such as the Yangtzé River Valley, to the deep interior. While this effort pales in comparison to the Soviet effort in the face of German onslaught, it occurred nearly 5 years previous and was accomplished with a far more primitive infrastructure. Many factories' equipment was literally carried thousands of miles via mule cart and ox barge.

In total, the Chinese moved about 120 thousand tons of factory equipment and 42 thousand workers that accounted for approximately 750 factories. About 75% of these were successfully re-established in the inner provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow, and Yunnan.

Since these factories represent the light industry found in China (there was virtually no heavy industry), they only cost 5 REs of transport to move. This is contrasted with the 30 REs required to evacuate a Soviet factory in *Scorched Earth* where the factories represent various heavy industries and produce armor and artillery points.

**Rule 37F. Special Rules / Hwang Ho Dikes.** On June 20, 1938, the nationalist government demonstrated that it understood the meaning of total war. In an unprecedented sacrifice of civilian and military life and incalculable damage to property and country side, the KMT had the Hwang Ho dikes destroyed just north of Kaifeng. From a military point of view, the strategy worked brilliantly. The Japanese advance was stopped cold in the face of the onrushing flood waters and the assault on Wuhan (the

Hankow, Hanyang, Wuchang tri-city area) was delayed for three months while the Japanese re-planned their advance to circumnavigate the new river course. Throughout the war, the Japanese never advanced beyond the new course of the Hwang Ho and were forced to trek hundreds of miles north or south to move further west.

However, the destruction of the dikes has been bitterly criticized for its blatant disregard of life. In fact, the nationalist government for many years denied any prior knowledge of the event. The flood waters wrought more suffering on the Chinese peasants of the area than the Japanese ever did. Some 4 to 5 thousand villages and 11 towns were washed away. Over 2 million Chinese were left homeless and destitute. Some estimates of the number of deaths range as high as 440,000. A number of military units, both Japanese and Chinese, were also caught and destroyed in the floodwaters.

The Chinese people of the area never forgave the Nationalist government for what they viewed as irresponsible and unconscionable actions. After the conclusion of the war with Japan, this area, remembering the events of the spring of 1938, was one of the first regions to go staunchly Communist.

**Rule 38A. Nations / Japan.** The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) were at constant odds with one another and inter-service rivalry was intense (dwarfing the inter-service rivalry experienced by their US counterparts). The entire grand strategy of Japan was never settled; the IJA wanting to strike into China and ultimately Siberia, and the IJN wanting to strike to Southeast Asia.

As China was considered an IJA theater, the IJN involvement was limited and this rule puts restraint on the ahistoric use of IJN ground forces in the Chinese hinterland.

**Rule 38B. Nations / China.** The capture of the KMT government, although causing huge political ripples, would probably not have spelled the end of Chinese resistance, despite Japanese beliefs to that effect. In all likelihood, an alternate form of government would quickly have filled the power vacuum and established itself within the existing political power infrastructure. So numerous were the alternate political bodies within China, that it is difficult to predict what political entity would emerge in such a situation. The later the KMT collapse, the more likely the Communists could have formed a stable alternate régime, at least in the north.

Since such political issues are far beyond the scope of this game, and for gaming and rules simplicity, I allow for a possible return of the KMT government in the event that it has been captured. This game mechanic actually represents the return of some alternate form of government within the existing bureaucratic machinery and not necessarily a reincarnation of the KMT. This event is fundamentally different than a wholesale collapse of the Chinese political power structure, which was the ultimate Japanese goal and is the Japanese player's goal in the game.

**Rule 38F. Nations / France.** After the fall of France in June 1940, the French Indo-Chinese supply routes were no longer available to the Chinese. Further, in September of that year, the Japanese finally had pressured the Vichy government into allowing Japanese forces to occupy Indo-China. Despite some minor clashes between Japanese and French troops, the Japanese

quickly occupied the region and began using it as a base of military operation and in particular air raids on southwest China. Finally the Japanese had bases in reach of the Burma Road.

**Rule 39. Guerrillas Bases.** The CCP's concept of guerrilla warfare was rooted in their experiences during the Nationalist's anti-Communist suppression campaigns of the early 1930s. By the time of the Sino-Japanese Conflict, the guerrilla theory had evolved into a three-tiered, cyclical philosophy of warfare. The three levels were the conventional army, the local defense force and the village militia.

In practice, the Communist Red Army, officially designated as the 8<sup>th</sup> Route Army by the central government, filled the roll of the CCP's conventional army. Following the onset of the Sino-Japanese Conflict, the three divisions of the 8<sup>th</sup> Route Army (the 115<sup>th</sup>, 120<sup>th</sup> and 129<sup>th</sup>) infiltrated behind Japanese lines in the rural hinterlands of northern China. They spun off cadres who began to form Communist bases across North China. A Communist base was typically a complete social, economic, political and military entity. Infiltration was enacted at all levels including education, local politics and local defense and touched Chinese society at the root level. The Red Army cadre would then form local militia. Militiamen were marginally trained men who maintained their civil functions and were available for military duty on an as-need basis. They were poorly equipped and used whatever weapons were at hand. They remained economically productive members of the local society and thereby avoided the usual loss of desperately needed manpower normally associated with military conscription in China. This made the militia easier for the local populous to accept favorably.

As a Communist base became more economically stable and could support a full time army, the best of the militiamen were formed into local defense forces. Also, stray Chinese Army units caught behind enemy lines, semi-bandit para-military groups and existing local defense associations were recruited to form local defense forces. Local defense forces were full-time military units that operated geographically near their point of origin. Their training and equipment were somewhat better than that of the militia. Their numbers could be temporarily augmented by militiamen on an as need basis. The CCP was very careful to balance the size of the local defense force with the economic capability of the base area to support a non-productive, full time army.

Ultimately, to complete the three-tiered cycle, local defense forces were used as a source of recruits for the conventional Red Army and occasionally entire local defense units would be promoted to Red Army units *en-masse*.

Typically, Communist bases were formed in the rural hinterland beyond the reach of the Japanese who could only effectively secure urban areas and strips of territory along principle communications routes. Due to the CCP's relatively benign recruitment policies, their suppression of bandit groups in base areas, and their generally professional treatment of the local population, they became very popular among the peasantry in North China. The *War of Resistance* guerrilla rules reflect the effect of CCP bases from a military point of view. The sabotage points represent militiamen, armed bandit groups and other semi-organized units that caused indiscriminate damage in Japanese occupied regions, guerrillas units represent local-defense forces

that straddled the line between underground resistance and conventional warfare, and, of course, the CCP light infantry units represent the conventional warfare capability of the Red Army.

The Nationalists also organized guerrilla units behind Japanese lines. Their effort was far less systematic than the CCP's and did not embody the philosophical, political and economic content of the CCP bases. In general, Nationalist guerrilla units were disorganized formations of units that found themselves caught behind enemy lines. They, like the CCP, enlisted local manpower to augment their numbers, but usually in the more traditional manner of gang conscription of all able-bodied males in a village. This activity proved economically devastating to those left behind, since all the manpower (to work the fields, etc.) was taken away with no form of subsidy.

For gaming simplicity, despite the fact that the Nationalists didn't have bases in the sense that the CCP did, I treat guerrillas from both factions in the same manner. The difference from a military point of view during the Sino-Japanese Conflict is not very significant and is represented by the different rates of guerrilla recruitment. During the 1946-49 civil war, the difference becomes paramount, but this is beyond the scope of *War of Resistance*.

CCP bases in Central China are less efficient than North China due to the fact that Central China was the heart of the KMT controlled region. As a result, CCP recruitment and operations in this area suffered direct interference from the KMT.

**Rule 40B. Replacements.** The conscription system in China was abysmal and this has been factored into the Chinese replacement rates. The typical Chinese conscription method was to enter a village and round up all able-bodied males and march them off to combat. The village left behind suffered immensely having no manpower to work fields and perform other chores. The local government rarely paid any form of subsidy to the devastated village. This practice magnified the traditional hatred of their army held by most common Chinese. And, amazingly, the conscripted soldier suffered more than the villagers he left behind!

Often gang marched, chained to fellow villagers, the conscript would be corralled at local conscription centers. He was given virtually no training and little equipment. Stripped of clothing during the night to prevent escape, many froze. A meager food allotment was a rare treat. In the Chinese system, conscripts were not part of the army until they reached their assigned units. As such, they were not paid and generally not fed.

Long marches to their destination units, often hundreds of miles, led to mass desertion and death. It is estimated that fully 40% of conscripted men never reached their assigned units.

The Chinese standing army at the start of the Sino-Japanese Conflict was 1.7 million men with 500 thousand reservists. After dipping to a low of 1 million men (following the heavy casualties of the 1937 disasters), the size of the Chinese army steadily increased throughout the war. By the end of 1941, the Chinese army numbered 5.7 million including about 3 million front-line combat troops. By the end of the war in 1945, the number had swelled to over 8 million men in arms.

To maintain this army, the Chinese conscripted about 14 million men during the 8-year war period (1937-45). During this time the front line replacement rate never dipped below 60%

annually, and occasionally peaked as high as 120%. During the war, China determined that she needed to draft between 2.5 and 4 men for every man on the front lines. This represented the high percentage of wounded, sick, deserters, and general mismanagement of military administration. Over 8 million of the 14 million conscripted, can not be accounted for. With the typical desertion rate estimated at between 10 and 40% annually, many of the 14 million may have been the same men, repeatedly conscripted.

While China's mobilization index (the average number of men conscripted as compared with the nation's total population per annum), at 0.4%, remained well behind that of Japan and western nations (Japan: 1.3%, UK: 1.4%, US: 2.4%, USSR: 3.0%, and Germany: 3.8%) she never had trouble filling the gaps in her lines. Manpower was always far more plentiful than equipment. Proposals for a Chinese army of 50 million were tendered, but were unrealistic given the utter lack of equipment and infrastructure necessary to support so many men in the field. In fact, General Stilwell and other American advisors repeatedly suggested that the Chinese should reduce the size of their army to about 100 higher quality divisions (rather than the 300+ ineffective divisions that existed in the mid to late war period).

**Rule 40B1 Replacements / Production.** The Chinese had no domestic heavy industry to produce armor or artillery. However, they did produce small arms and ammunition. The equipment RP received by the Chinese at Hupei (per the Chinese OB), represents what little domestic production the Chinese did have. The armor and equipment RPs received at Kansu represent equipment sent to China by the Soviet Union. This equipment was generally sent via the ancient caravan routes from Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan to Lanchow.

**Rule 41A2. Preparing for Play / 1937-41 Campaign Scenario / Opening Turns.** The Sino-Japanese Conflict was not born out of any master plan or coordinated effort on the parts of the participants. Over exuberance on the part of local Japanese commanders in China led to local conflicts throughout the 1930's. Finally, on July 7, 1937, an incident at Lucaochao Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge) sparked a conflict from which the diplomats could not extricate their nations.

The Chinese Nationalist government, seen for years as appeasing the aggressive Japanese military leaders, could no longer back down in the face of surging Chinese patriotism. The Japanese diplomats, for their part, often had little control over local military commanders, who would operate at the edge of Tokyo's intent or, in the extreme, ignore the command of Tokyo outright.

By the end of July, the inertia of the situation had thrust the participants into full-scale conflict. Assured that it would be a short campaign to settle the situation in north China, Tokyo half-heartedly sanctioned a limited offensive and allowed reinforcements to be sent.

Central China, on the other hand, had been relatively quiet since the 1932 battle of Shanghai. During this engagement, the Chinese 19<sup>th</sup> Route Army (of Cantonese origin) stood toe to toe with the Japanese for several months in Shanghai street fighting. Losing international face, the Japanese finally poured in reinforcements in an amphibious assault at the Chinese shores of the mouth of the Yangtze River north of Shanghai. This force

swept behind the 19<sup>th</sup> Route Army threatening to cut it off completely from the rest of China. The Chinese army then retreated about 20 miles and took up new defensive positions. The Japanese took this opportunity to declare victory and sue for negotiated terms.

The 1932 terms provided that Japanese units return to and remain in the International Concession and that Shanghai be occupied by only Chinese peace preservation units. The regular Chinese army was to remain at a distance of 20 miles for a short period until tensions had settled.

In fact, the Chinese armies never reoccupied the 20-mile band encircling Shanghai and it, to the constant objection of the Chinese government, became referred to as the demilitarized zone. While there was no legal basis for the zone to be considered demilitarized, it became a defacto demilitarized zone due to the Chinese decision not to reoccupy it.

This was the situation when hostilities erupted in North China. The Nationalist government then immediately undertook to reoccupy the "demilitarized zone," and began moving troops into the area and into Shanghai proper. The Japanese, of course, saw this as a direct affront to the defacto situation that had existed, and a number of incidents ensued. Finally, on August 13, 1937, the Chinese government launched a wholesale offensive against the Japanese Naval marine (SNLF) garrison in the International Concession. Bitter fighting ensued and the Japanese units were pushed to the brink with their backs to the Whangpoo River, fighting from the docks. Unable to turn the tide with the small SNLF garrison, the Japanese diverted forces earmarked for North China and formed the Shanghai Expeditionary Force (SEF) to relieve the beleaguered marines. The SEF amphibiously assaulted in a manner very similar to the relief assault of 1932.

To reflect this curious opening balance and the increasing momentum of conflict, I developed the opening turn rules. The North China rules reflect the existing military infrastructure enjoyed by the Japanese (due to the Boxer protocols of 1901). The Central China rules simulate the difficult decision on the part of the Chinese as to when and whether to attack the international concession and the Japanese reluctance to open up additional conflict there unless necessary.

**Rule 42. Victory Conditions.** The KMT government and Chinese national "unity" was perpetually under the threat of collapse. Each disaster undermined the stability and authority of the national government. The Japanese's primary goal was to force the KMT into submission so that China would fall into a divided state of anarchy in which the Japanese could dominate the various local authorities and ultimately form a puppet régime favorable to the Japanese.

This rule shows the ever-present chance of Chinese national collapse. If the game follows a historical course, the Chinese resistance stands about a 50% chance of surviving until the end of 1941. The first 4\_ years of the conflict are by far the most militarily active, and in my opinion, present the greatest risk of KMT collapse resulting from the Japanese effort. Later in the war, internal risks such as unchecked inflation, Communist expansion, and so on, dominate the threat to KMT stability. I chose 50% arbitrarily, but I don't think its unjustifiable and the value is also a convenient number for playability, since if all goes

per history, there is an even chance that either player will win the game.

In the event, a collapse of resistance per this rule probably wouldn't have spelled the end of the war against Japan. Various resistance pockets and guerrilla groups (in particular the CCP) would surely have continued the fight. But this is far beyond the scope of the game and enters the realm of wild speculation. The fact remains that the Japanese goal was the collapse of Chinese nationalist unity and resistance and they viewed the demise of the KMT as a major component of that collapse. Therefore, to drive the game along historical lines without resorting to "strait-jacket" rules, these victory conditions are based, in part, on the perceptions of the national and military leaders of the time.

National collapse is fundamentally different than the mere capture of the government. While the capture of prominent political figures is a great blow, it pales when compared to the erosion and collapse of political infrastructure and popular support for the war. Rule 38 outlines the effects of the capture of the top level of government while this rule simulates the utter collapse of the functioning of government on a broad base.

The basic mechanic of this rule has two components; the stability level and stability number. The stability level represents the overall state of the political power and infrastructure of the Chinese nation. The stability number reflects immediate events and how they might affect the national stability.

Some events affect the stability number immediately, while others only after the stability roll has been performed. The effects of traumatic events are immediately posted and take a definite and immediate toll on the Chinese national stability number. This shows the government's propaganda time lag and it's inability to prevent the immediate effects of those disasters.

Other events modify the stability number after the stability roll thereby simulating the government's ability to politically ameliorate political perception of these events and forestall the immediate effects. These events (such as the existence of CCP bases) erode the KMT's ability to maintain stability without having immediate catastrophic effects.

**Rule 44F Urban Pacification Garrison.** Of my own volition, I would not have included this rule. However, I yielded to the democratic process, as a survey on lysator's *Europa* e-mail list resoundingly called for its inclusion. The general gist of the arguments made was that any event that has military implications at the *Europa/Glory* scale should be modeled in the game. Well, here you have it. With the help of the folks on the *Europa* e-mail list, this rule may be the first published, official rule co-designed via the Internet.

**Rule 45. Chinese Factions.** We must not think of China as a single unified entity in the way we think of western nations. It was, at best, a loose coalition of semi-autonomous regional authorities each maintaining their own armies and swearing a wide range of allegiances to the central government (the *Koumintang* or KMT). The KMT used many techniques for keeping regional forces loyal, both internal and external. Internal techniques included infiltration of regional units by politically reliable officers, a call to Chinese patriotism, and spreading out and intermingling of units of various factions among each other to destroy their command cohesion. External techniques

included withholding or delivering supplies and equipment based upon performance and loyalty, bribery of leaders, political promotions for reliable leaders, land grants, and so on. The KMT spent as much energy keeping units loyal and under control as it did fighting the Japanese. Chén Chéng, a prominent KMT general, had stressed in 1938 the need "to eliminate the concept of private interests, to convert all armies into genuine national armies, and to thoroughly eliminate the erroneous notion of self-preservation and self-protection." His goal was never realized, however.

Since the balance of political power in China hinged upon the military strength of the factional leaders, each faction was loath to commit forces to combat. To lose military strength was to lose political clout. Therefore, factional leaders were reluctant to defend territory since they could rarely expect neighboring units to come to their rescue at the critical moment. Units were even less likely to take the offensive. Aleksander Kalyagin, a Russian advisor, remarked that a commander "might receive an order to attack, but would withdraw his troops to the rear, surrender a city, and not even receive the slightest punishment. What can one make of this? [To learn the answer,] one must look into the 'Church calendar,' see what sort of general this is, which province's troops he is commanding, in which province he is fighting, which troops he is cooperating with, etc., and then everything will become clear."

At the extreme, factions would enter combat against each other. This was particularly prevalent with Chinese Communist forces. There are hundreds of documented skirmishes between Communist and non-communist forces, both sides being guilty of starting hostilities at various times. Most of these conflicts are too small to be explicitly represented at the *Europa* scale, but a few did occur at that magnitude. I give antagonistic factional units ZOCs versus other friendly units to represent the constant friction between them.

Since the patchwork of wartime factionalism in China is far too complex to model in a game, I've simplified the situation and boiled it down to the 15 most significant factions and defined their military behavior with a simple "level of cooperation" system. The use of resource points and steps of supply as a way to modify the factional cooperation die roll is a simple way to model the use of military resources for political purposes.

**Rule 46. Puppet Governments.** The Japanese set up a plethora of puppet governments within occupied China. These governments ranged from local to regional and even "national" governments. On occasion, the puppet governments were actually rivals with one another, as they had been setup by different Japanese military units for the same purpose.

The purpose of the puppet government was multifold. On a grass roots level, the puppet government provided a mechanism for controlling the local populace and provided the trappings of law and order. Internationally, they were intended to give the illusion of legality and justify the invader's presence as liberator. Militarily, they provided manpower for various occupational duties. Ultimately the existence of the puppet regimes was intended to be a destabilizing force designed to help topple the KMT government.

Again, as with the other rules depicting the political situation in China, this rule is a simple model of the far more complex

situation that actually existed. It captures the essence of what the Japanese were trying to accomplish and how they attempted to do it. The principle events concerning the puppet governments during the war can be simulated. I have not attempted to show the actual governments that were set up in China during the war, since the course of the conflict is instrumental in determining when and where the regimes would have been set up. Instead, I provide for a general capability that can be used by the Japanese player as it fits his progress in China.

To minimize special rules, the pre-existing puppet governments of Manchukuo, East Hopei, Formosa, and Inner Mongolia are included as special cases of this rule.

The following gives a feel for the actual events. In 1937, the Japanese created the following Mongolian puppet governments: the Southern Chahar Committee at Wanchwan, the Northern Shansi Autonomous Government at Tatung, and the Federal Autonomous Government at Suiyuan. In November 1937, these three bodies were combined to form the United Mongolian Committee.

In North China's Hopei Province in July 1937 the Peiping Maintenance Committee was established and in August of the same year the Peace Maintenance Committee was setup in Tientsin. By mid-August, the Northern China Peoples' Autonomous Federation was set up and, in mid-December, the China Restoration Government was organized.

In other northern provinces a variety of governments were also setup. In the latter part of 1937, the Honan Province Autonomous Government was organized while, in mid-December, a set of self-governing provincial bodies were set up in Shansi Province. In January 1938, in Shantung Province, various peace maintenance committees were established at Tsinan and Tsingtao.

The above listed North China provincial governments were all affiliated with the China Provisional Government, an ostensibly "national government," until the spring of 1938.

In Central China the Shanghai Tatao Government was setup in the first part of December 1937, while the Nanking and Hangchow Autonomous Committees were established in their respective cities in January 1938. These local bodies formed the basis for the China Restoration Government, the Japanese Central China Area Army's version of a national government, located in Nanking in the latter part of March 1938.

Additional autonomous bodies were established in each district as the Japanese enlarged their occupied territory. All of these bodies were affiliated with the China Provisional Government in North China or the China Restoration Government in Central China, according to their location.

On March 31, 1940, after nearly two years in development, Wang Ching-wei, a formerly prominent KMT member, formed a new national puppet regime that was formally recognized by Japan on the 30th of November. His regime went by the same name as the KMT Nationalist government: The Republic of China.

## Japanese Orders of Battle

The 10-12-6 Lt Inf XX, 10-12-8\* Mtn XX, 9-11-6 Lt Inf XX, 9-11-6\* Lt Inf XX, and 8-10-6\* Lt Inf XX represent the early war Japanese divisions which were very large square, four-regiment

formations. Their ratings are derived more from their size more than from any special ability or equipment. Starting about 1939 and continuing into the early 1940s, the Japanese reorganized their divisions along the triangular, three-regiment concept. The rating of these divisions is 7-9-6 Inf XX or 7-9-6\* Inf XX.

The following table outlines the typical composition of the Japanese divisions.

Japanese Divisional Composition		
	Square	Triangular
men	21,945	15,220
rifles & carbines	9476	6867
light MG	541	273
heavy MG	104	78
AT Guns	22	14
Mountain guns	36	36
70mm battalion art. guns	18	18
75mm regimental art. guns	12	12
mortars/grenade launchers	576	310
light/medium tanks	17	16
tankettes	7	-
light trucks	266	-
horse drawn vehicles	555	N/A
horses	5849	3466
<i>Note:</i> The above TO/E are typical. The Japanese Army employed a number of different official TO/E in various places and at various times. <i>N/A:</i> information not available		

The typical Japanese square division contained two infantry brigades of two regiments each, plus an artillery regiment, engineering regiment, cavalry regiment, armored company, and quartermaster's regiment. The cavalry regiments, engineering regiment, and armored company are very small, and do not show up at *Europa/Glory* scales. The net effect of all of the organic armored companies in China is shown by the four 1x 1-0-8 Lt Tank [II] received by the Japanese player early in the game.

The three-tiered breakdown concept for the square divisions allows the Japanese player the flexibility to operate the divisions alternately as brigades, regiments, or battalions, depending upon the strategic situation in the game.

Some of the Japanese divisions are non-standard and have been rated accordingly.

Japanese divisional cadres and other units (such as Japanese brigades) have remnants that are essentially the cadre's cadre. This reflects the Japanese *Bushido* or fighting spirit. Their tendency to avoid surrender and fight beyond all hope of victory translates, in game terms, to a greater residual combat strength following a crushing defeat.

Each Japanese square division was assigned a tank company of 17 light and medium tanks and 7 tankettes. The Type 95 HA-GO light tank (37mm gun) and the Type 89B CHI-RO medium tank (57mm gun) were the principal Japanese tank types in use in China at the opening of the conflict. The Type 95, in general, proved to more useful in the difficult Chinese countryside due to its lighter weight, better maneuverable and higher speed. In

addition, both the IJA and the SNLF employed wheeled armored cars that proved particularly useful for urban combat but less than satisfactory in rural areas.

**Air Units.** Both the IJA and IJN maintained wholly separate air forces. It is generally noted that the IJN air force was far superior to its IJA counterpart. To reflect this, the IJN has a better fighter pilot superiority modifier and a better air unit replacement rate than does the IJA.

Moreover, to further show the superiority of the IJN, I grouped IJN air units by 40 aircraft each while requiring about 50 IJA aircraft per unit. Due to the sketchy and conflicting nature of information regarding the exact quantities and types of Japanese aircraft that fought in China, I used these numbers as approximate guidelines.

Aircraft that were leftover and didn't fit into an air group have been separately grouped into the following mixed air units. The Mxd-F Japanese fighter air unit is composed of 24x A2N3 (Type 90), 6x A4N1 (Type 95), and 12x A5M2 (Type 96) fighters. The Mxd-A attack bomber air unit is composed of 19x B3Y1 (Type-92), 28x B2M2 (Type-89) and 12x B4Y1 (Type-96) attack bombers. And finally, the Mxd-D dive-bomber air unit has 18x D1A2 (Type-94) dive-bombers and 9x B4Y1 (Type-96) attack bombers.

Since the domestic production of the IJA's heavy bomber, the Ki-21-1a was behind schedule, the Japanese purchased a number of BR.20 aircraft from Italy as a stop gap to augment its bomber force until domestic production could catch up. The BR.20 were employed in both China and Manchuria against the Soviets during the Nomonhan (Khalkin Gol) Incident. The Japanese version of the BR.20 was armed somewhat differently than its Italian counterpart, and the different ratings reflect this.

**Naval Units.** The TFs represent the general Japanese naval assets operating in the Chinese Theater. The IJN-C shows the vessels that were moored at Shanghai before the onset of hostilities. The major ship in this task force was the old pre-WWI battleship *Idzumo*. IJN-3 represents the Japanese 3<sup>rd</sup> fleet that was operating off Chinese shores at the opening of hostilities.

The Japanese also operated three carriers in Chinese waters, the *Kaga*, *Ryujo* and *Honjo*. The *Kaga* is a large carrier and is represented by a separate carrier group counter while the *Ryujo* and *Honjo* are smaller and are combined into a single carrier group counter.

**Puppets.** The Japanese employed a number of puppet formations that were organized both before and during the war. Data regarding puppet armies formed during the war is very sketchy. Furthermore, their existence and composition was highly situational and had the war taken even a slightly different course from historical, the puppet formations might have appeared very differently. Thus, instead of trying futilely to track all of the myriad of puppet organizations, I formed a general rule which allows the Japanese player to create and tailor puppet governments and their armies to the situation he is faced with in his particular game. Ironically, I believe that it can be argued that this is a better historical simulation than trying to trace all of the actual puppet armies that existed in the event.

On the other hand, I show the actual units of puppet armies that were in existence before the war began. Their existence and composition was fixed before the start of the game.

**Notes from AEG.** The following paragraphs summarize and paraphrase a series of excellently detailed research noted sent to me by Arthur Goodwin during development. I have contributed my own annotations in a few cases.

- *11<sup>th</sup> Division:* The 11th division begins the campaign broken down. The General HQ in Tokyo sent the "Ayama Detachment" to Darien in the Kwantung Territory for fear of a general uprising in that area. The detachment consisted of one infantry regiment and one mountain artillery battalion from the 11th division. No uprising ever materialized and the Ayama Detachment was ordered to rejoin the 11th division in early September 1937.
- *The North China Garrison Brigade:* the North China Garrison Brigade (5-7-6\* Lt Inf [XX] NCG) is also known as the "Kawabe Brigade." At 12,000 men, 2 infantry regiments, 1 full artillery regiment it is functionally a division in size. At the start of the campaign units of the Kawabe Brigade are dispersed throughout the Peiping-Tientsin military district. When the brigade officially becomes the 27<sup>th</sup> division (Oct I 37), it only added 1200 men.
- *North China Garrison Engineer Regiment:* The North China Garrison Engineer unit (1-6 Eng III NCG), that starts the campaign in Tientsin, is the only engineer unit in the Japanese Army that is really a regiment (it has 2100 men to TO/E vs. 900 in a typical engineer regiment). In game terms, other Japanese engineer regiments are functionally battalions.
- *North China Special Garrison Unit:* The North China Special Garrison Unit (0-1-5 Pol III 1NCG) began the campaign with 3 battalions and 2700 men in Tientsin. By May 38 the unit has 8 battalions and nearly 5000 men. Thus, the receipt of 0-1-5 Pol III 2NCG at that time.
- *North China Garrison Forces:* The 1-8 Tank II NCG represents a variety of miscellaneous units operating in Tientsin including 2 medium tank company, 1 horsed cavalry company, 1 motorized infantry company, 1 tankette company, and 1 AT platoon.
- *The 1<sup>st</sup> Independent Mixed Brigade:* The 1<sup>st</sup> *Dokoritsu Konsei* (Independent Mixed Brigade, 5-6-6\* Lt Inf X 1DK) was also known as the Sakai Brigade. This unit was part of the Kwantung Army and began the campaign in Jehol.
- *6<sup>th</sup> Division:* The 11<sup>th</sup> brigade of the 6<sup>th</sup> division is often cited as an independent formation and referred to as Suzuki Brigade. In actuality it was detached from its parent unit only temporarily, being reabsorbed in Aug 37. It began the campaign from Chengte in Jehol. The 36<sup>th</sup> brigade of the 6<sup>th</sup> Division arrives in China in Aug 37. In Dec 40, the 6<sup>th</sup> Division was triangularized in China by splitting off the 47<sup>th</sup> Regiment which ultimately joined with the Formosa Brigade in Feb 41 (See *Formosa Brigade*).
- *Senda Mechanized Division:* The Kwantung Army Armor School organized Senda (contraction of *Senshadan* [Tank Group]) and dispatched it as a whole unit to Inner

Mongolia. Its artillery was officially the 1<sup>st</sup> Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment, but their horses and mules were exchanged for trucks, therefore it is motorized and has no mountain capability. The Senda unit was assembled into an ad-hoc division to sweep across southern Suiyuan to the end of the rail line at Paotao. In the game, Senda has a limited operational area reflecting the Kwantung Army commanders' reluctance to let the unit operate beyond Mongolia and risk losing control of it to the North China Area Army. The Kwantung Army held Manchuria, Mongolia, and the Kwantung Territory as its sphere of control and did not directly cooperate with the Japanese armies in China.

- *Hsingan Division*: the Hsingan division (2-7\* Cav XX Man/Hsi), received at the start at Changpei in Inner Mongolia, rates self-supported owing to its 24x 75mm horse-drawn guns.
- *Chingnan Division*: The Chingnan division (2-3-5\* Inf XX Man/Chi), received as a conditional reinforcement and part of the Chahar Expeditionary Force, rates self-supported owing to its 36x 75mm guns.
- *Square Division Substitutions*: Many Japanese divisions downsized while operating in China. They did so not by splitting off whole combat units but instead they peeled men out of the existing structure and simply never made up the losses. Men extracted in this manner helped form the rear-area HC (*Heitan Chikutai* [line of communications sector]) units. This is shown by the Square Division Substitutions. The 5<sup>th</sup> and Guards divisions never downsized in China. Both were "elite" units on special TO/E. Thus, they are not available for the substitution. Moreover, the 11<sup>th</sup> division is not available for substitution since its HC command was never activated in China and the division was withdrawn for good in Mar 38.
- *Japanese Tank and Engineer Regiments*: The Japanese tank regiments were actually battalion in size and are thus shown with the [II] symbol. The unit ID is changed to include "r" for *rentai* (regiment). For example, the 5<sup>th</sup> regiment is shown with unit ID of "5r". Similarly, Japanese engineer regiments (900 men) are shown using [II], and their unit IDs modified to include the "r".
- *5<sup>th</sup> Division*: The 5<sup>th</sup> division (10-12-8\* Mtn XX) was hurriedly rushed into action before being fully assembled in Japan, and thus the Japanese player receives its breakdown components piecemeal and can assemble it only after the entire division has entered play. It arrives in Aug 37 as a mountain division. The divisional artillery is mountain artillery and the entire division had just undergone 6 months of mountain training at Mt. Fuji just prior to the campaign in China. The division's LOC (1x 1-2-4 Static X 5HC) command was activated in Japan, and finally arrived in China in Dec 37. When the 5<sup>th</sup> Division is transferred out of China from Jul to Oct 39, its LOC command remained behind.
- *SNLF*: The SNLF organization stops at the battalion level. However, 1 Sasebo and 2 Kure SNLF battalions were almost 3\_ times their standard size when they went

to China in Aug 37. The extra manpower was extracted from 2 Sasebo and 1 Kure battalions plus enlisting all available men from the Sasebo and Kure depots. In game terms, the following happened in Japan prior to the transfer of the SNLF units to China:

*Reorganize*: 2x 1-6 SNLF II 1Sas, 2Sas (IJN) and 1 Inf RP to:  
1x 3-6 SNLF III Sas (IJN)

*Reorganize*: 2x 1-6 SNLF II 1Kur, 2Kur (IJN) and 1 Inf RP to:  
1x 3-6 SNLF III Kur (IJN)

- *1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Reserves*: the 100 series divisions (8-10-6\* Lt. Inf XX) are reinforced square divisions, but they are *Yobi-eki* units (1<sup>st</sup> reserve) and thus of lower quality. The 4-5-5° Res [XX] units are *Kobi-eki* (2<sup>nd</sup> reserve).
- *Construction Units*: In the Aug to Dec 37 timeframe, 61 independent engineer labor units were sent to China. These units were company sized (200 men each). 34 were sent to North China (shown by 2x 0-1-5 Cons III 2NCG, 3NCG on Aug II 37), and the remaining 27 going to Central China (shown by 2x 0-1-5 Cons III 1CC, 2CC on Aug II 37).
- *The Formosa Brigade*: At 13,000 men, 2 over-strength infantry regiments, and a full mountain artillery regiment of 36 guns, this unit was functionally a division when it arrives in China in Nov 37. In Feb 41, the Formosa Brigade is combined with the 47<sup>th</sup> Regiment from the 6<sup>th</sup> Division (see *6<sup>th</sup> Division*) to form the new 48<sup>th</sup> Division.
- *Field Replacement Units*: Beginning in Jan 38, the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 3<sup>rd</sup> *Yasen Hojutai* (Field Replacement Units) moved to China from Japan. In May 40, these units were joined by the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> *Yasen Hojutai* and the Central China and North China Training Commands. A field replacement unit averaged 5000 men, while the training commands controlled all school and training assets in their areas (10 to 20,000 men each). The 3<sup>rd</sup> *Yasen Hojutai* transferred to North Indo-China in Sep 40.
- *Independent Mixed Brigades, China TO/E*: The 2<sup>nd</sup> through 20<sup>th</sup> *Dokoritsu Konsei* (Independent Mixed Brigades), that begin appearing in Apr 38, were garrison units with limited mobility and a much lower scale of heavy weapons than the regular army independent brigades such as the 1<sup>st</sup> Independent Mixed Brigade of the Kwantung Army. Each of these brigades contained 5 reduced strength rifle battalions and the brigade as a whole had only 12x 75mm guns (and in some instances, these guns were replaced by 70mm infantry guns or even 90mm mortars). These units had no motor vehicles and only limited horse assets (they did not even have the bicycles a normal infantry battalion had). The men in these units were a mixture of *Kobi-eki* (2<sup>nd</sup> reserve) and *Hoju-eki* (replacement reserve).
- *1<sup>st</sup> Independent Mixed Brigade*: The 1<sup>st</sup> *Dokoritsu Konsei* (Independent Mixed Brigades) in China has a confusing history. From Aug 37 through Jun 39, there was a 1DK Brigade in the Kwantung Army, so when the China Garrison DK Brigades were formed, they started with 2DK. In Jul 39, when a new batch of DK Brigades were formed in China, they back-filled the 1DK number.

- *2<sup>nd</sup> & 7<sup>th</sup> Divisions:* In May 38 the Kwantung Army briefly dispatched the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division and the 13<sup>th</sup> Brigade of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division to China. They were recalled in Jun 38. The 7<sup>th</sup> Division had been mountain trained (its home station being Sapporo, Hokkaido and its ranks drawn from mountaineers) and its guns were mountain artillery.
- *The Cavalry Group:* The *Kihei Shudan* (Cavalry Group, 5-4-8\* Cav [XX]) was composed of two cavalry brigades, the 1<sup>st</sup> and the 4<sup>th</sup>. This unit operated as a composite unit for only a short period. By and large, the brigades operated independently. For game purposes, I leave the method of deployment of this unit at Japanese player's option.
- *15<sup>th</sup>, 17<sup>th</sup>, 20<sup>th</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> Divisions:* These divisions, which begin appearing in Aug 38, were reactivations of divisions that had been stood down in the 1922-25 timeframe. They were regular (not reserve) units and had a triangular organization.
  - The 15<sup>th</sup> was formed by joining the re-raised 51<sup>st</sup> Regiment to the independent 17<sup>th</sup> Brigade.
  - The 17<sup>th</sup> was formed by joining the re-raised 81<sup>st</sup> Regiment to the independent 34<sup>th</sup> Brigade.
  - The 21<sup>st</sup> was formed by joining the re-raised 83<sup>rd</sup> Regiment to the independent 20<sup>th</sup> Brigade.
  - The 22<sup>nd</sup> was formed by re-raising the 84<sup>th</sup>, 85<sup>th</sup>, and 86<sup>th</sup> Regiments.
- *Independent Infantry Units:* The 1<sup>st</sup> through 10<sup>th</sup>, and 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> *Dokoritsu Hohetai* (independent infantry unit, later re-designated as regiments) were raised and dispatched to China beginning in 1939. Each of these units was formed from three independent infantry battalions and, by and large, the units were used for garrison duty. The 11<sup>th</sup>, 12<sup>th</sup>, and 13<sup>th</sup> *Dokoritsu Hohetai* were re-designations of the three regiments that were part of the 26<sup>th</sup> Division, formed in Oct 37.
- *Imperial Guards:* The Imperial Guards Division had a unique reinforced TO/E. Each infantry regiment had 4500 men (vice the normal 3850). Also the division had 36x 75mm guns and 12x 105mm howitzers and thus was fully supported (12-14-6 Lt Inf XX). In Dec 39 the division was officially disbanded into the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Guards Brigades. The 1<sup>st</sup> Guards were dispatched to China while the 2<sup>nd</sup> Guards and all of the artillery remained in Japan. In Jul 40, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Guards and the divisional artillery went to China. In Sep 40, the 1<sup>st</sup> Guards (still without artillery) went to northern Indo-China. In Jun 41, 2<sup>nd</sup> Guards, the divisional artillery (less 12x 75mm guns) and the new 5<sup>th</sup> Guards Regiment (formed from reserve elements) became the Guards Division. Remaining reserve elements became the 1-2-4 Static X Gds HC. At the same time, the 1<sup>st</sup> Guards Brigade was given the 12x 75mm guns from the divisional artillery and re-designated the Guards Mixed Brigade (6-7-6\* Lt Inf X Gds) and was returned to Japan.
- *4<sup>th</sup> Division:* The 4<sup>th</sup> Division was reinforced to Kwantung Army standards and took its heavy artillery to China when it was transferred there in Jul 40. The division was assigned to the China Strategic Reserve. In Oct 41, the division was reassigned to the Southern Army as their General Reserve. The division moved then to Shanghai and remained there until it was sent to the Philippines.
- *104<sup>th</sup> Division:* The best elements of the 104<sup>th</sup> Division were split off to form the 21<sup>st</sup> *Dokoritsu Konsei* (Independent Mixed Brigade) in Jan 41. After the conversion the 104<sup>th</sup> Division had the same TO/E as the 32<sup>nd</sup> to 41<sup>st</sup> series of divisions.
- *32<sup>nd</sup> to 41<sup>st</sup> Divisions:* These divisions formed from new draftees with lower levels of equipment than the regular divisions. More importantly, none of these divisions got any specialized (mountain, jungle, or bicycle) training, thus they are shown as pure infantry units (and not light infantry).
- *Kwantung Replacements:* In Apr 41, the Kwantung army transferred 4 replacement draft battalions to China. These are shown as Inf RP and not combat units.
- *Parachute Training:* In Jan 41, the Japanese began training airborne formations; the IJA in Hopei Province and the IJN on Hainan Island. The IJA used their training units at least twice during 1941, once in a crossing of the Hwang Ho (Yellow River) and once at the Battle of Changsha. It is not clear whether they were air dropped or used as additional infantry at the Hwang Ho, but they were definitely dropped at Changsha.
- *14<sup>th</sup> Tank Regiment:* The 14<sup>th</sup> Tank Regiment, which arrives in China in Jul 41, is equipped with light (not medium) tanks. Hence its rating (1-8 Lt Tank [II] 14r).
- *23<sup>rd</sup> Antiaircraft Regiment:* The 23<sup>rd</sup> Antiaircraft Regiment has 1100 men, 16x 75mm guns, 8x HMG just barely rating 1 point of AA.
- *3<sup>rd</sup> Division:* The 3<sup>rd</sup> Division is triangularized in Aug 41 by splitting off the 18<sup>th</sup> Regiment which is transferred to the Kwantung Army (and becomes part of the new 29<sup>th</sup> Division).
- *Line of Communications Commands:* From Sep 41 to Nov 41, the 41<sup>st</sup> through 80<sup>th</sup> *Heitan Chikutai* (line of communications sector unit) are raised. Most are raised in Manchukuo and some in Japan. Only the 42<sup>nd</sup>, 50<sup>th</sup>, 51<sup>st</sup>, 52<sup>nd</sup>, and 53<sup>rd</sup> are sent to China.
- *5<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Reserve Units:* The 5<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Reserve Units were disbanded in Nov 41 to bring their parent units and the 33<sup>rd</sup> Division up to full strength.

## Chinese Orders of Battle

The Chinese Order of Battle presented wholly different problems from the Japanese Order of Battle. The fractured nature of the Chinese military was itself a significant obstacle. The Nationalist Government wished to appear as a unified nation to the outside world. Thus, allusions to the various factions are difficult to come by and I can find no definitive list of which units pledged allegiance to which faction. Therefore, my factional assignments are largely the result of careful guesswork based on scouring narrative accounts by non-partisan historians. For example, I often assigned a unit to a faction based on a remote reference to it, or its commander, being from a particular province or political clique.

On occasion, I was able to dig up specific notations regarding a unit's affiliation. The Communist units, for example, are so well documented that I am confident these assignments are correct. The "Generalissimo's Own" (rated 4-6\* Inf XX), elite central army units are well documented. Some of the warlord factions have, by chance, been documented while others are difficult to verify even the existence of. For example, the Yunnanese army of warlord Lung Yun has been referenced in a number of works and I am relatively confident of the Yunnan unit assignments. On the other hand, I have only found the sketchiest of information regarding the Hunanese army and I assume its existence based only on indirect references.

Regardless of the specific unit assignments, I believe that I have captured the overall effect of Chinese factionalism from a military gaming point of view. I have good data regarding the size of the various major factions, and I have made special effort to shoehorn unit assignments to fit the overall known size of the factions. Truly a Chinese puzzle...

The Chinese divisions, like their early war Japanese counterparts, were also "square", but were only supposed to contain about 11,000 men. However, rarely did a Chinese division contain its full complement of men or equipment. Typically, in the field, a Chinese division ran from 3000 to 5000 men. This is particularly true of the provincial warlord divisions.

The following table outlines the allocated composition of a Chinese division.

Chinese Divisional Composition	
	Square
men	10,923
rifles & carbines	3821
light MG	274
heavy MG	54
pack howitzers	16
light artillery guns	30
mortars/grenade launchers	243
trucks	see note
horse drawn vehicles	see note
horses	see note
<i>Note:</i> The Chinese, and particularly the provincial units, largely conscripted their transportation vehicles from whatever civilian equipment was at hand in the area. Hence, most Chinese provincial units have a movement rating of four and Central Army units five.	

The typical Chinese divisions was organized around two infantry brigades of two regiments each, plus an artillery battalion, an engineering battalion, and a quartermaster's battalion. The regional Chinese armies tended to be the poorest units, lacking equipment, supplies, training, leadership, and morale. As such, they are rated as 1-4° Inf XX. The KMT Central Army units were somewhat better off, being first in line to get materials and resources and therefore rate 3-5\* Inf XX.

**The Communist Army.** Chinese Communist divisions were among the best-disciplined units fighting the Japanese. At the

onset of the conflict, the CCP fielded three divisions of roughly 20,000 men each. The Communist Army, in contrast to Chinese military tradition, enjoyed the favor of the peasantry, particularly in the north. To reflect this, CCP divisions are highly rated (7-5° Inf XX) as compared to other Chinese units. Moreover, they are always considered in supply for movement purposes reflecting the fact that they had to spend less time foraging for food since local farmers were inclined to feed them voluntarily. They are given cadre sides to reflect the superior training, discipline, and ideological motivation displayed by these units. As described above in the guerrilla rules section, the Communists expanded their army via a grass roots guerrilla base system. The following table shows the total strength of the two principle Communist armies and the equivalent combat strength in game terms. Note that the game strength shown indicates total unit combat strength and includes both regular Communist and guerrilla unit strengths.

Expansion of the CCP Red Army		
Year	8 <sup>th</sup> Route Army N. China	New 4 <sup>th</sup> Army C. China
1937	80 (16)	12 (2)
1938	157 (31)	25 (5)
1939	270 (54)	50 (10)
1940	400 (80)	100 (20)
1941	305 (61)	135 (27)
1942	340 (68)	111 (22)
<i>Note:</i> Table is in thousands of men at start of year, approximate game strength is in parenthesis.		

Note the dips in manpower in 1941 in the North China and in 1942 in Central China. The North China reduction is a result of aggressive Japanese guerrilla suppression campaigns that followed the Hundred Regiments Offensive (See the Battle Scenarios Booklet for a scenario on this offensive). The reduction in Central China is due to the New 4<sup>th</sup> Army incident whereby Communist and Nationalist elements clashed in a major dispute that ended any slim hope of continued mutual cooperation against the Japanese.

**Kwangsi and Kweichow.** On several occasions I have come across narrative accounts that make reference to the fact that the Kwangsi and Kweichow provincial armies were the best of the warlord armies. To reflect this I have boosted their defense and movement ratings making them 1-2-5° Inf XX. These provinces were led by the coalition of Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen, two "enlightened" warlords who placed an emphasis on domestic prosperity in their provinces. Their government included such progressive policies as elementary public education. The Kwangsi and Kweichow armies were well paid and equipped (by provincial Chinese standards) making them more loyal and effective than the typical provincial army.

**Szechwan.** The Szechwan faction, on the other hand, is often cited as little more than an unruly rabble. The Szechwan province was a feudal province with no central organization. A plethora of minor warlords ruled fiefdoms throughout Szechwan until the Central Army, while chasing the Communists on their long march, entered the province in the 1935-36 timeframe. The

KMT used this military presence to nominally unify the province and coalesce the army. By the start of the war with Japan, the Szechwan army was "unified," but far from well trained.

**Muslims.** While the Muslims of far-western China did not lay a full stake in China's conflict, they did send a number of units into the fray and probably would have sent more if their region had been directly threatened. The performance of the Muslim troops was considered top notch as compared to the other regional armies in China.

**Manchuria.** When the Japanese occupied Manchuria in 1932, the Manchurian army resisted briefly and then escaped to China. Their warlord-governor, Chang Hsueh-liang was regarded as one of the more loyal warlords to the central government. After the Communist long march to northern Shensi, the KMT assigned the dislocated Manchurian army to southern Shensi to guard against southward penetrations of communism. Preferring to fight Japanese rather than Chinese, Chang and other officials in Shensi, perpetrated the Sian Incident whereby they kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek and demanded a united front, along with the Communists, to resist Japanese aggression. Despite Chiang's refusal to submit to his abductor's demands, the ultimate collapse of the coup, and his release, this incident does seem to have stiffened the KMT's opposition to Japanese aggression curtailing their previous appeasement policies. Chang Hsueh-liang was placed under house arrest for the remainder of his life, and the Manchurian army was transferred to southern Hopei and Honan, where it was situated at the start of the conflict with Japan.

**Miscellaneous Forces.** The MNF and MSF represent random groupings of lesser warlord armies in north and central/south China, respectively.

**The Central Army.** The Central Army was the best trained (with the possible exception of the Communist Army) and equipped Chinese army. It was the official army of the Republic of China, the internationally recognized government of China. At the outset of the war, the bulk of the Central Army was located in the lower Yangtze River valley. The 4-6\* Inf XX represent the "elite, Generalissimo's Own," German-trained divisions. The 3-5\* Inf XX represent the typical Central Army division, which was in general substantially better than their provincial counterparts.

The Chinese Central Army had three armored battalions in 1937, two of which operated near Shanghai and the third near Nanking. These units contained small tanks and tankettes such as the machine-gun armed Vickers Carden-Loyd amphibious tankette, the Italian L3/35 light tank and the German PzKpfw IA. The largest tank in the Chinese arsenal was the British built Vickers 6 ton MkE & MkF medium tanks that supported a 47mm gun. In addition to the tanks, the Chinese used a few dozen German armored cars such as the PSW 221 and 222 and a plethora of indigenous "armored cars," cobbled together with whatever materials were at hand. The warlord armies in particular, used makeshift "armored cars."

Chinese artillery consisted of a variety of gun types from a number of nations but largely from Germany and the Soviet Union. The German 3.7 cm PaK 35 was the standard antitank weapon of the nationalist forces.

China had about 7000 trucks in 1937. They appear in this game as SMP since they were used almost exclusively for the

transportation of supplies. Many were employed in remote areas, such as the far-western caravan route to the Soviet Union across Sinkiang to Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan.

**The Chinese Navy.** At the outset of the conflict, the Chinese navy consisted of 66 ships and 12 torpedo boats totaling 59,000 tons. The bulk of these vessels were small patrol boats and river craft. The two largest ships were the sisters Ping Hai and Ning Hai. Displacing 2,500 tons each, these ships each supported six 5.5 inch guns, six 3.5 inch AA guns, and 8 machine-gun. They were 360 feet in length, capable of 22.25 knots, and had a total crew of 340 men. On September 23, 1937, Japanese aircraft sunk both of these ships near Chiang-yin while they were supporting ground operations along the Yangtze River bank.

**The Chinese Air Force.** The Chinese Air Force was relatively new in 1937. The retired American Colonel Chennault (later of AVG fame) who had been hired by the Chinese government for the purpose commanded it. The Chinese Air Force had 305 combat aircraft that had been imported from many different nations. Originally planning to deploy in North China, the eruption of hostilities in the Shanghai area caused the Chinese to keep virtually the entire air force in the Yangtze River valley. The Mxd-F fighter unit represents an assortment of aircraft such as CR.32s, BA.27s, Boeing P-26s, and Corsair biplanes. The Mxd-B bomber unit contains CA.101s, Br 3s, SM.72s, and He111s. The Mxd-T transport unit represents a variety of transport aircraft both in military and civil service including predominantly DC-3s (the civilian version of the C-47). The Chinese National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) was often pressed into military service as need arose.

## General

After the outbreak of the Pacific war with the Western Allies, the Chinese front cooled from a conventional warfare point of view. The Communists shunned direct warfare in favor of guerrilla tactics and the nationalists were simply too worn to mount any sort of military campaign. The Japanese, for their part, were bogged down in a political/geographic quagmire from which it proved impossible to extricate themselves.

With the belief that Japan was doomed at the hands of the Western Allies, and particularly the United States, the various Chinese factions began to look more towards the post war situation than at any serious threat to the Japanese. As the war dragged on, the Japanese became more insignificant in the Chinese thinking and ultimately took on the role of an annoying sideshow to the real politics of China.

But, this was all after Pearl Harbor and one of the principal reasons why I limit the Sino-Japanese Conflict game from 1937 to 1941. The early years are characterized by a Japanese drive into the Chinese interior that the Chinese repeatedly fail to check. At the outset, the Communists and nationalists each observe a tenuous "united front" whereby they join forces against the invaders. The Communist armies are recognized and authorized for specific sizes by the nationalist government and they even draw salaries from national treasury.

Slowly, the Japanese bog down in the face of a strained logistic system, increasing guerrilla activity, and continued nationalist army opposition. The mere fact that the nationalist army, repeatedly decimated for several years, remained standing is a

tribute to Chinese will to resist. Finally, the Japanese met what has been referred to as their Stalingrad, the three battles of Changsha. After these defeats, the last in late 1941, the Japanese never again mounted a serious offensive in China until the desperate Ichigo in late 1944.

The Sino-Japanese conflict begins conventional in nature and then slowly bogs down into a guerrilla war by the early 1940's and ultimately becomes a political chess game with the post-war control of China at stake.

I think the military campaigns of the pre-Pearl Harbor years are very interesting and *War of Resistance* provides a good military simulation of events that are not common knowledge in the west.

## The Defense of Shanghai

It is easy and common to criticize the foolhardiness of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists for recklessly committing and wasting the bulk of their *crème de la crème* in the futile defense of Shanghai. But, if one steps away from the world of perfect hindsight and considers the situation presented to these men, their actions become less questionable. In hindsight we know that the decision to defend Shanghai was wrong, but it may not have been irrational.

Consider, first, in August of 1937, the Japanese had not yet conquered vast quantities of Chinese territory sweeping Chinese armies aside and leaving them in the wake. Nor was it yet clear that they were even capable of doing so. They had merely wrested control of Peiping (Peking) and Tientsin from low quality provincial troops who essentially evacuated, rather than defended, those cities.

Second, the military precedent of conflict in Shanghai had been set in 1932. In that skirmish, Chinese troops stood toe-to-toe for two months and slugged it out with the Japanese and only retreated after the Japanese landed troops with superior armament and equipment in an enveloping move. There was no reason to believe that, given additional support in 1932, the Chinese defenders could not have held out indefinitely.

Third, the Japanese garrison in Shanghai was relatively small, and with the war not being officially declared or even sanctioned in Tokyo, there was no reason for Chiang Kai-shek to believe that the Japanese would reinforce the area with huge quantities of men and materials. Incident upon incident had erupted throughout the thirties and there was little indication at this early stage, that this was not simply another.

Fourth, Shanghai was the commercial and industrial heart of the Nationalist controlled region and of China itself. For the Nationalists to simply yield Shanghai following a decade long policy of Japanese appeasement would have been a national disgrace and would risk having broken the Chinese morale and destroyed the credibility of the Nationalist regime, which was already on shaky footing. I would venture the proposition that history would have been even harsher on a Chiang Kai-shek that failed to defend Shanghai.

Fifth, and finally, the Nationalists were hoping to spur western support through a gallant defense of Shanghai. Shanghai was the site of the largest western concessions and a battle there would set the stage for western observers to see the Japanese onslaught first hand. Chiang Kai-shek believed, naively, that the west

would actually send substantial support and that an aggressive defense of Shanghai would bolster the Chinese prestige abroad.

The preceding rhetoric is not intended to defend Chiang Kai-shek's blunder, for it was that, a major blunder. It is merely intended to point out that the blunder was not as irrational as narrow hindsight would have us believe.

## Japanese Equipment

### AFV:

*Type 89 KO CHI-RO Medium Tank (1932)* - Mitsubishi 11.5 ton gasoline powered medium tank. Armament: 57mm short barrel gun, 2 x 6.5mm MG (one fwd one aft). Armor: 10 to 20 mm. Speed: 13 to 15 mph. The gasoline-powered engine often had problems in the cold of Manchuria. Narrow tracks limited its effectiveness off road in soft terrain. Generally used in the infantry support role. This tank was a direct descendant of the Vickers Mark C commercial tank.

*Type 89 OTSU CHI-RO Medium Tank (1936-40)* - Upgrade of the KO version, this med. tank was diesel powered and could achieve a 25 mph speed, despite its increased weight of 12.7 tons.

*Type 92 Heavy Tankette (1932)* - Ishikawajima 3.5 ton lt. tank. Armament: 2 x 6.5 mm MG. Speed: 25 mph. Armor: 6mm. Later production versions substituted a 13mm MG for one of the 6.5mm MGs. These hv. tankettes were designed for the cavalry support role and had a crew of three.

*Type 95 HA-GO Light Tank (1935-42)* - Mitsubishi 6.5 ton light tank. Armament: 1 x 37mm Gun, 2 x 7.7mm MG. Speed: 40 mph. Armor 6-12mm. An excellent tank using an air-cooled diesel engine that provided an excellent power to weight ratio. Its small size and good cross-country capabilities made it very effective in China.

*Type 94TK Tankette (1934)* - 2.6 ton tankette. Speed: 42 mph. Crew of 2. Armament: 1 x 6.5 or 7.7mm MG. 4 to 12 mm armor.

Originally conceived as an AFV to pull a tracked 1.5 ton supply trailer into combat, this tankette had a poor weight to track area ratio causing it to often run afoul in off-road conditions. Later versions of the tankette mounted a 37mm gun and had 16mm armor in critical spots. Western intelligence often mistook this tank for the Type 92.

The first Japanese armored unit was formed in 1931 when the Kwantung army combined a platoon of tanks with a platoon of armored cars to form the Independent Tank Company of the Kwantung Army. This unit was employed in combat that same year north of Harbin, Manchuria. In 1934, a mechanized brigade was formed near Kungchuling, Manchuria with the intended use against Soviet forces. Much of Manchuria being suitable for armor operations gave Japanese armored theorists a false impression of the effectiveness that armor might have in China.

Throughout the mid-30s the Japanese experimented with a variety of mixed tank type armored units, but logistic concerns and difficulties ultimately nixed this concept.

In China, the typical armored company had 10 tanks (either M89's or M95's). Three companies formed a regiment.

### Armored Cars:

The effectiveness of wheeled armored cars in China's more modern cities, such as Shanghai, was immediately realized.

Against lightly armed Chinese soldiers, armored cars generally proved sufficient protection.

Once the fighting moved into the rural hinterland, the armored car became a sudden liability, as its wheeled configuration could not properly deal with the lack of infrastructure found in these remote regions.

In China, the Japanese used four principle types of armored car.

*Naval M25 Armored Car* - A Vickers-Crossley design with a domed turret mounting two parallel Vickers-Maxim MG on top of a commercial truck chassis. Armament: 8 to 11 mm. Double tires on rear axle for increased payload. Weight: 5 tons.

*Naval M92 Osaka* - A completely Japanese design intended to replace the M25 beginning in 1932. Superficially similar to the M25, it incorporated a number of improvements such as a more conventional turret with one MG forward and one aft. Weight: 5.8 tons. Speed: Just under 40 mph.

*M92 Imperial Naval Armored Car* - This armored car supported a tankette turret and had two rear axles. Weight: 6.5 tons. Speed: 50 mph. Armament: A Hv. MG in turret and a Lt. MG to the right of the driver. Ports on the side and rear of the armored body and a mount on the top of the turret were also used for the Lt. MG.

*M93 Sumida* - were similar to the 3-axled cars in appearance but could be converted to run on rail lines in just 20 minutes. Armor: up to 16 mm. Armament: one Hv. MG and rifle slits around the armored box. The Sumida was used effectively against guerrillas along the rail lines.

#### **Other Vehicles:**

*M92A Prime Mover* - A tracked towing vehicle used to pull heavy artillery pieces.

*M81 Truck* - A six wheeled open-body vehicle.

Trucks were rare enough to be organized into separate transport units that were generally used in logistic work, although occasionally they were employed in a combat roll as well. As late as 1940, a Japanese division still had less than three hundred organic trucks. Instead, the division depended primarily on the three to five thousand attached horses and mules.

#### **Antiaircraft Artillery:**

Since the Chinese had virtually no effective air force, the motivation to develop AA was low. Many smaller caliber AA units were converted to MG units and used in a ground combat role.

*M88* - A 1928 piece with a slow traversing dual-purpose 75mm gun. Manual aiming made the effective range much less than the actual range of the weapon. Weight: 5390 lbs. Rate of Fire: 15 to 20 rpm. Range: 15,000 yds for a 14.6 lb round. Altitude: 30,000 ft for a 14.6 lb round.

#### **Artillery:**

During the war in China, the Japanese employed a wide variety of calibers ranging up to 230mm siege artillery pieces, but the real workhorses were the 75mm guns and howitzers.

*M4 Tashio Howitzer* - This short barreled, 150mm bore, box-tail carriage gun was antiquated by 1937 but widely employed by the Japanese due to the quantities of it on hand. The gun broke down into two pieces for transport, a considerable asset in China, where poor roads and bridges were a constant problem. Weight: 6100 lbs. Range: 7500 yds for an 80 lb round.

*M96 Howitzer* - A modern split-tail carriage howitzer, the M96 began to replace the M4 in 1936. Bore: 150mm. Range: 11,400 yds.

*Tashio 14 Howitzer* - Split-tail carriage, 105mm bore. Range: 15,000 yds with a 35 lb round.

*M92 Howitzer* - Split-tail carriage, 105mm bore. Range: 20,000 yds with a 35 lb round.

*M91 Howitzer* - Split-tail carriage, 105mm bore. Range: 11,500 yds with a 35 lb round.

*M41 Howitzer* - A 75mm mountain gun, this weapon disassembled into highly portable pieces. This gun fired a 14 lb. high explosive shell or a 15 lb shrapnel shell to 7800 yds. Weight: Approx 1000 lbs. Rate of Fire: 10 rpm.

*M94 Howitzer* - Similar to the M41, this mountain gun was slightly lighter. It threw a 13.5 lb round to a range of about 9800 yds. Rate of Fire: 15 rpm.

*M38 Field Gun* - Obsolete by 1937, this 75mm gun saw plenty of action well into the 1940s due to its plentiful quantities. Weight: 2501 lbs. Range: 13,080 yds with a pointed nose shell and 9,000 yds with a high explosive shell. ROF: 15 rpm. This gun could be set up to fire in just two minutes.

*M90 Field Gun* - Long barreled 75mm bore. Range: 13,300 yds for a 14.3 lb shell.

*M95 Field Gun* - Short barreled 75mm bore. Range: approx 7 miles.

*M92 Field Gun* - A highly portable 70mm weapon, this gun weighed just 468 lbs. Its stubby barrel could be elevated to fire like a mortar. Range: 1.7 miles for an 8.4 lb round. Rate of Fire: 10 rpm. This gun could be manhandled across rough terrain by its crew and was thus popular with Japanese troops despite its flimsy construction and strong recoil. This gun was used extensively in China.

Since Chinese armored strength was just a token of antiquated vehicles, the two Japanese 37mm antitank guns saw little action in China.

*M11 Tashio Antitank Gun* - A 1922 gun almost identical to the 37mm French WWI gun. Weight: under 200 lbs. Penetration: .7 inch of 1920s armor. Range: approx 1 mile.

*M94 Antitank Gun* - Bore: 37mm. Weight: 815 lbs. Range 5500 yds. with a 1.5 lb shell. Penetration: 1 inch of 1930s armor. This gun was used throughout the war.

Mortars were used extensively by the Japanese infantry. Of the eight mortars employed by the Japanese in the 1930s, six were used extensively in China. The two 50mm types were not used very often in China.

*M97 81mm Mortar* - This 81mm mortar, along with the M99, became the standard Japanese infantry support weapon. Weight: 145 lbs. Range: 3000 yds for a 7 lb shell or approx. 1200 for a 14 lb shell.

*M99 81mm Mortar* - Bore: 81mm short barreled. Weight: 52 lbs. Range: 2000 yds.

*M97 90mm Mortar* - This mortar, weighing 220 lbs, was effective in static situations.

*M94 90mm Mortar* - Weight: 340 lbs. Range: 4000 yds with an 11.5 lb round.

*M93 150mm Mortar* - Weight: 557 lbs. This weapon was strictly a siege weapon and had a range of only 2000 yds when firing a 44 lb shell.

Although they were mechanically inferior, the Japanese machine guns were probably the most effective of the infantry support weapons employed in China.

*6.5 mm Tashio 3 Hv MG*- The most widely used MG in China, this Hotchkiss-type weapon weighed 60 lbs and was easily transportable. Although obsolete by 1937 standards, this weapon was still used in large numbers. While not generally used in this manner in China, the gun could also be set up as an anti-aircraft weapon. The gun had a slow rate of fire (400 rpm) causing allied troops to refer to it as the "woodpecker."

*7.7 mm M92 Hv MG* - This weapon was very similar to the Tashio 3 using the same mount and virtually identical in appearance. Weight: 63 lbs. Rate of Fire: 450 rpm.

A heavier 13mm MG was also available, but was generally reserved for mounting in AFV.

*6.5 mm M96 Lt. MG* - This Bren-like weapon weighed 22 lbs and was mounted on a bipod. Rate of Fire: 550 rpm. This weapon could also be used as an excellent one man automatic weapon.

*7.7 mm M92 Lt. MG* - A Lewis-type weapon, the M92 was simply an M96 up-chambered to handle the larger caliber ammunition.

*7.7 mm M99 Lt. MG* - Weight: 20 lbs. Rate of Fire: 500 - 550 rpm. Mount: monopod.

The Japanese used three rifle types, all based on the 1898 Mauser bolt action, and all chambered for a 6.5 mm round.

Each soldier had a 14 ounce, 15.5 inch bayonet with which he received extensive training. The bayonet was psychologically linked to the ancient warriors of Japan.

There were several versions of grenade. Two stick versions were used, one looking similar to the German "potato masher." Other versions were cast iron with brass fuses. Most had waffled surfaces, but the M99, at just 10 ounces, supported a smooth exterior.

The flame-thrower was devastating to the Chinese when used, but the Japanese had too few to make a serious impact on the overall war.

## Chinese Equipment

A definitive list of Chinese small arms and artillery is almost impossible to assemble. Every sort of import and captured weapon was employed. Standardization was virtually non-existent. Generally, if available, each squad had an automatic weapon of some sort. A company might have a few machine guns, generally of .30 caliber. Larger units might have a 20mm anti aircraft gun or even a 37mm anti-tank gun. Divisional weapons included bores ranging from 75mm to 155mm, but these were general antiquated or captured pieces and were always in seriously short supply.

### Vehicles

At the outset of the conflict, the Chinese had a variety of antiquated AFV and about 7000 trucks. Many smaller pre-war European models were on hand. The more significant version are listed.

*VCL M1931* - 29 of this British manufactured amphibious tankette were purchased in 1935 and organized into the 1st tank battalion. Weight: 3 tons. Armament: One 7.92mm coaxial MG.

*L3/35* - About 100 of this Italian tank were purchased. A number of them served with the 2nd tank battalion. Weight: 3.5 tons. Armament: One bow mounted MG.

*PzKpfw IA* - A small number (possibly 10) of this German vehicle served with the 3rd tank battalion. Weight: 5.5 tons. Armament: one coaxial MG.

*Vickers 6-Ton Mk E & F* - About 20 of these British tanks were purchased and used in the 1st and 2nd tank battalions. Weight: 7 tons. Armament: One 47 mm gun and one bow MG.

*VCL Mk VI Carrier* - 24 of these vehicles were purchased by China in the mid-1930's and used as part of the 2nd tank battalion. These tiny vehicles were designed as a carrier to increase the mobility of the Vickers MG. Weight: 1.5 tons.

*T-26 M33* - Some 88 of this Soviet tank was supplied in the 1938 to 1939 timeframe. Most were formed into the 1st tank regiment that was assigned to the newly forming 200th Infantry Division, the only totally motorized infantry formation in the Chinese Army during this time period. Weight: 10.5 tons. Armament: One 45 mm gun and one bow mounted MG. Some had a second MG for AA purposes.

A variety of armored cars were employed throughout China during the conflict. In addition to foreign purchases and aid, such as the German PSW 221 and Soviet Ba-20 and Ba-6, many indigenous versions assembled from materials on hand. Particularly in warlord armies, ordinary trucks would have metal plates bolted to the sides of the vehicle and a machine gun mounted on the top and thereby became an "armored car." Put several of these vehicles together, and the warlord then commanded an armored brigade.

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