The Game Review Richard Berg Wouldn't Dare to Publish! :-)
The following review was drafted in 1980, soon after Game Designers
Workshop came out with its new "Series 120" game, "1941: Operation
Barbarossa." In its way, it is a neat design--at least as good as GDW's
"Great Patriotic War" which followed it some yearslater. I don't know
who has publishing rights--I heard somewhere that it had been
re-published in a European wargame magazine--but it is worth
consideration by someone, in that regard. I myself have four copies, I
have just discovered. Tournament, anyone? :-)
I offered the review to Richard Berg for his newsletter, but (to his
credit, I guess) he was leery of charges of bias, if he let the designer
of a competitive game--"Sturm nach Osten"--do the honors.
Lou Coatney
PANZEROGRE
or
The Creatures that Ate Ivan
1941: OPERATION BARBAROSSA
John M. Astell, Designer
17"x23" mapsheet, 120 single-sided counters, 16-paged rules and tables
booklet, one die, boxed, $5.98. [sigh!]
Game Designers Workshop, Bloomington, IL 61701
[See end of review for capsule comments and assessments.]
Reviewed by Louis R. Coatney
A couple of years ago, I playtested my own Russian Front campaign game
design--STURM NACH OSTEN ... I SHTURMY NA ZAPAD!--as a prospective "120"
with Frank Chadwick, John Astell, and other members of the GDW crew.
Because of format limitations and contract differences, GDW's
publication of SNO never transpired. Afterwards, a discussion arose at
GDW as to whether the 1941 game should be on the African or the Russian
campaign. The decision to go with the Russia game was (rightly) made.
Naturally, I became a little apprehensive about how much GDW might draw
upon SNO. However, it appears that my worries were entirely unfounded
and that 1941 is a distinctive interpretation of Great Patriotic War
military operations unto itself.
Physically, the game is up to GDW's typically high graphic standards.
All components are attractive and functional, with the possible
exception of the box itself. The Series 120 box size is smaller than a
standard bookshelf size, and the extra-stiff mapsheet suffers many folds
and a warping bend, in order to fit. A flat playing service is not
readily possible when it issues from such a womb.
Another thing about the 1941 box that I don't like is its art. Mr.
Hentz's drawing is as cluttered, chopped, and ugly as was that of GDW's
1940. Crowded into the scene is a veritable museum of militaria and one
rather grotesque character. But then, some consider war itself to be an
ugly and grotesque business.
The mapsheet is generally outstanding. Covering only Operation
Barbarossa (Jun41-Mar42) in month-scale game-turns, the game's scope
stops at the western borders of the Soviet Union. Canted similar to THE
RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN's map--the North compass arrow seems to be about 30
degrees off - 1941's map covers as far north as Arkhangelsk, as fareast
as Gorki, and as far south as Maikop. Southern Finland is included. The
scale is 41mis/65 kms per hex--19 hexes from Warsaw to Moscow (vs.
STALINGRAD's 21, THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN's 20, Sturm NachOsten's 18, and
BARBAROSSA'S 15).
Rivers are along hex-sides. There is some confusion at the mouth of the
Dnepr (which should have been north of the isthmus in hex 3320). The
rivers are conservatively drawn: e.g., the Dnepr stops at Smolensk and
the Dvina at Vitebsk. This is good, in that the rivers are less
significant obstacles themselves in their upper reaches, but it is
sometimes bad in that there is often marsh and woods at the source of
many of Russia's great rivers. For example, terrain is pretty thick at
the source of the Dvina River in the Roslavl(2014) - Bryansk area. A
river along 3220/3221 could have represented the tidal basins that
enhance Odessa's defensibility. The Dvina Riverbend should have been at
1318(/Dvinsk), not around 1418.
Major rail lines are mapped accurately, and John has made sense of the
basic patterns of the seemingly chaotic Russian tracks. (The only
significant omissions I see are the connection from Stalingrad to the
Saratov-Astrakhan line and the Kalach spur which would give the Soviets
their historical logistical base north of the Don River.)
Swamp seems a little sparse around Tichvin and a little excessive north
of Zhitomir. Considering their prohibitive movement and combat
penalties, swamp hexes might have been more conservatively dispensed in
this area.
As to the cities, they are very selectively chosen and rated (major vs.
"reference") with a few exceptions: the absence of Memel, Libau, Parnu,
and some Black Sea ports as well, is puzzling in view of the importance
of ports in the optional strategic sea movement rules. Brest and the
significant mining and industrial cities of the Donbas (other than
Stalino) are absent. Vilno seems one hex too south - or is Kovno/Kaunus
one too north?
In one or two instances coastline hex-sides seem ambiguous. Nonetheless,
1941's map far surpasses those of STALINGRAD, THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN, and
BARBAROSSA in detail and general design.
1941's victory conditions are strictly geographical and embodied by
strategic city objectives. The relative victory assessment values of
these seem generally valid but exclude such significant cities (and
regions) as Stalingrad and Grozny. In view of the critical importance of
the German *Panzergruppen* to Axis offensive operations, the loss of any
of these units would have serious strategic consequences in the game's
historical context, and the Russian player should be rewarded
accordingly in the standard game as well as in the optional/extended
game.
1941's units and their starting positions reflect the game'soverall
emphasis on historical detail. For example, each and everyone of the 25
Soviet 1941 mechanized corps stationed in the westernSoviet Union is
accounted for, although they are frequently paired in nonhistorical
"group" units. A mechanized "group" like the "6/11" is defensible, since
elements of these two corps were historically committed together in
Nikitin's counterattack near Bialystok. Unfortunately, one or two
"groups" have little or no historical basis. Why the 5. Mechanized Corps
(which historically went into action alongside the depleted 7. Mech
Corps near Orsha) was paired with the 16. MechCorps (which was attached
to the 12. Army near Chernovtsy) is highly questionable.
If one of the reasons for pairing thee Russian mechanized corps was
economizing the game's number of pieces, the device was a mistake.
Thanks to their stacking ability, the few *individual* Russian
mechanized corps are even more important than the more powerful
mechanized "groups." (The disproportionate importance of these minor
units reminds me of STALINGRAD's three 2-3-6 armored corps units.)
John has obviously gone to much effort to include as many of the Russian
1941 armies as possible and to enter them into the game at historically
accurate times. However, considering the importance of the individual
mechanized corps, most of the mechcorps should have been individually
specified, instead, for the sake of the game's operational consistency.
Since there is no shortage of Russian army 4- 3s during the game, some
of these could have been omitted and compensated for with an increased
replacement rate.
Another feature of the Russian order of battle I don't like is the fact
that - with the exception of three 8-3s, two 6-3s, and the four
(understrength) 6-2 shock armies - all of the Russian armies are 4-3s.
Considering the hasty formation and varying composition of these units,
historically, their uniformity in the game would seem difficult to
justify. Unfortunately, 1941's abbreviated "Series 120" format
apparently did not permit the inclusion of game design commentary or
bibliography to explain such design decisions.
The Russian units, like the Axis units, begin the game in predetermined,
historical locations (or in their appropriate months of appearance on
the turn record track). The accurate locations and strengths of the
Russian units are crucial in 1941, since the beginning Axis operations
are essentially determined by them. The locations are basically
correct, with only a few minor exceptions. For example, D.D.
Lelyushenko's 21. Mech Corps was initially attached to the 22. Army
stationed near Velikiye Luki. It went into action northeast of Dvinsk
(1818) and was nowhere near Riga, where it is positioned in 1941's
setup.
The 22 Jun 41 composition of Soviet armies in the line - given in rifle
and cavalry divisions, but minus their attached mech corps tank and
motorized divisions, their fortification zone detachments, and any
military district reserves - were: 7.(4), 23.(5-7), 8.(5),
11.(8),27.(4?), 3.(3), 10.(7), 4.(4), 13.(4?), 5.(5), 6.(4-6),
26.(3),12.(6), 18.(3?), and 9.(6?). (18. Army was officially formed
after the invasion.)
Soviet military historians have criticized the weakness of 3.Army, which
was responsible for defending the northern flank of the Western Special
Military District, facing Warsaw. 1941's strength allocations do not
conform to many of the above dispositions. The omission of the Soviet
cavalry and parachute corps is questionable if all the mech corps are
being specified, considering their importance in the Battle of Moscow,
1941.
The Axis order of battle is also intriguing. Most of the *Panzerkorps*
are consolidated into four *Panzergruppen*. These are"monster" units in
every sense of the world. They are immune to the risks of an "Exchange"
combat result when attacking most Russian units, thanks to a rule which
transforms an "Exchange" into a "D Elim" if the defender's combat
strength is less than or equal to one-third of the smallest attacking
unit's *printed* combat factor. When defending, they can retreat - as
well as trace supply - through unoccupied enemy Zones of Control. Since
isolation does not penalize units' defensive strengths, anyway, decent
attacks against them are virtually impossible. (A 3:2 combat odds column
is sorely missed in such a game system, as is a release of defender
retreat requirement option for the attacker.) The 46. *Panzerkorps* -
which should have been incorporated into the starting strength of
Guderian's 2.*Panzergruppe* - and the 40. *Panzerkorps* can be combined
into an adhoc *Panzergruppe*, but they lack this special, crucial
invulnerability to an "Exchange." Considering the extra exchange
possibility at 3:1 odds, such a drastic degree of invulnerability is not
justified by a mere administrative relationship and is not realistic.
As enjoyable as is conning these juggernaut armored units around the
battlefield, trampling everything in their path, I think they are a
conceptual mistake. The sparse and weather-sensitive road net of
European Russia could not sustain radical movements by such concentrated
quantities of tracked and (especially) wheeled vehicles. Since
infantry-type units are less dependent on roads and since they received
relatively greater benefit from the heavy equipment in (slow- moving)
army support elements, I think that the army-level units (used to sop up
some of the many Axis corps units) should have been the 8 German
(infantry) field armies. The final bludgeoning thrust by von Kluge's 4.
Army at Moscow in Nov/Dec41 was just one example of a field army
asserting its individually potent identity.
Other powers enjoyed by the *Panzergruppen* are common to all Axis and
Russian armor units. Armor units may advance directly from one Enemy ZOC
to another EZOC (as long as neither EZOC is that of an enemy armor unit)
at a cost of 2 additional movement points. (German armor units' movement
factors are, coincidentally, 6; while the Soviet armor units' movement
factors are only 5.) Thus, armor units are critically important to
defensive dispositions as well as to offensive operations. I dispute the
ability of an armor unit crossing a river to freely pass through the
ZOCs of an infantry unit without having to fight its way across.
Yet another advantage to armor units is the rule stating that an attack
composed *solely* of armor units against only infantry-type units
receives a one-column bonus shift in the combat odds - presumably for
unfettered speed and shock. My first game of 1941 (with and against
"grognards" Tom Lee and Jerry Corcoran of Minneapolis) I entered in its
second turn and was given the southern half of the Axis front, where the
1. *Panzergruppe* had been somehow backed into the Pripet Marsh and
hemmed in by Russian units on four sides. On my turn's first phase, I
selected a weak Russian mechanized "group" as the axis of my breakout.
(Attacks are entirely voluntary.) Thanks to a couple of column shifting
air points, I easily overran the mech group even at half/unsupplied
attack strength, and proceeded to run amuck.
One nice thing about the *Panzergruppe* unit is that you don't have to
manually wrestle with a towering "killer stack" of armor units, like you
do in STALINGRAD or THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN. Regardless of the historicity
question, 1941's "Panzerogres" make for an exceptionally intense and
free-wheeling game.
The airpower rules in the game are appropriate and versatile, but
occasionally irritating or irrational. An air point can do five things:
cancel out an opponent's air point/mission, reduce his railt ransport
capacity, provide offensive or defensive close air support, air-supply a
cutoff unit for an entire game-turn, or - if an Axis airpoint in cahoots
with two others - automatically eliminate Soviet seapower in the Baltic
or Black Sea. Unfortunately, the 120-unit counter ration prevents the
inclusion of badly needed air point markers to keep track of their
deployment and expenditure during the lengthy, four-phased game-turns.
There should also be some sort of reasonable range restriction on their
use - especially in the interdiction of rail movement. Finally, the
annihilation of the Black Sea Fleet should be much less certain than
that of the Baltic Sea Fleet which was confined to harbor.
Stacking is a little strange. The Russians can stack two units per hex,
one of which may be an army or group. The Axis may stack one army or one
*Panzergruppe* or two corps per hex. For German infantry,this seems a
little thin.
1941's standard player-turn sequence of 2 complete cycles of full
movement and combat reminds me of SPI's old classic, BATTLE OF THE
MARNE. This enables Russian as well as Axis units to advance, attack,
and then in the following phase scurry back to the most defensible
positions possible, without risk of any well-deserved counterattack.
Terrain-induced movement penalties for armor and infantry units are
differentiated and quite severe. The 2. *Panzergruppe*'s lightning
historical thrust - minus the 47. *Panzerkorps* which detoured north to
assist the closing of the Bialystok-Minsk Pocket - toward the Dnepr
River (along the road through the swamps south of Minsk) seems
impossible to duplicate.
Logically, rail transport is limited in unit capacity but unlimited in
distance. There are detailed optional provisions for sea movement which
I alluded to, above.
Defensive terrain advantages are extreme for units defending behind
rivers or against armor in swamps - attack factors are halved - but
comparatively mild for the rough/mountain terrain and forests. Only the
cities in red fortification hexes - Kronshtadt, Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev,
Odessa, and Sevastopol--receive a defensive combat (and stacking! ?!)
bonus, and that is comparatively drastic. Oddly, Stalingrad is
unfortified, while Brest-Litovsk does not appear on th emap even as a
reference city.
The Combat Results Table (CRT) is the standard retreat/elimination
model. Other than the lack of a 3:2 odds column and a dramatic
difference between the 2:1 and 3:1 results possibilities, the CRT is
satisfactory.
The supply rules for 1941 also have unique features. For example, an
unsupplied unit is not isolated and eliminated if it can trace a 5-hex
path through EZOCs to a supplied, friendly unit. A powerful unit in a
strong position can survive indefinitely in this state of suspended
isolation, I have found. Supply is also heavily dependent on rail lines,
with only a 3-hex operational supply radius from a railhead supply
source allowed.
As to the operational character of the game, I can say that it is very
simple and playable in mechanics. However, placement of armor units is a
crucial part of the game, requiring considerable time and thought. As
the Russian player in my principal playtest game, I lost the entirety of
the Western Ukraine and most of its defenders merely because I had left
one of my minor mechanized units 1 hex out of position. Such unforgiving
mechanics require meticulous play and discourage rapid and instinctive
maneuver. Although 1941 does provide the chaotic dash of its historical
campaign, the double-phase freedom of the game system allowed my Russian
forces a degree of operational and tactical speed and versatility which
is quite UNhistorical -and which my playtest opponent, fellow Alaskan
Hans Hazelton, decried with great bitterness. Indeed, the 3-5/8-3
Russian "fortress stacks" can stifle any German offensive in the
queenlike manner of oldS TALINGRAD's 7-10-4s.
Although advertized as a two-hour - that's a "120" in minutes, of course
- game, the double-length turns and meticulous play required make this
tournament length ideal impossible. Hans and I went 5 (out of 7) turns
with the utmost concentration in 5 hours. (He conceded at that point.)
Moreover, timed and hurried moves would ruin the game, especially for
tournament play.
One other important factor in the game's length is the high number and
turnover of units for the Russian player (which is quite historical, of
course). In addition to his 39 starting units, the Russian player
receives 29 reinforcement units and 25 replacement units (for a total of
93) - even if he doesn't continue the game into its three-month
Jan-Mar42 Soviet Winter Offensive extension.
My winning strategy as the Russian in 1941 was to continually attack and
bleed away the German infantry at whatever combat odds. By the end of
the fifth turn, Hans was having to use his *Panzergruppe* monster units
to anchor his thinning defenses.
Overall, I consider 1941 to be superior to STALINGRAD, BARBAROSSA, and
THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN in the historical flow of its Jun41-Dec41/Mar42
period, and it is as good as any of them in playably simulating the
operational character of the campaign. Moreover, its *Panzergruppe*
monster units provide a highly stimulating gaming experience. I commend
John Astell on his unique and entertaining game design about the largest
and most crucial military campaign in modern history, and I would
welcome his retaliatory critique of my own game on the subject when it
is (re-)published in THE WARGAMER (no. 19)later this year.
CAPSULE COMMENTS
Physical quality: Very professional. Game's components are clear,
attractive, and highly functional. Actual size, scale, and detail of
mapsheet equals most full-size games.
Playability: High. Standard operational/strategic level game mechanics
with a few interesting variations produces a very playable but
many-faceted game system.
Playing time: Unexpectedly lengthy. As much as 5 hours for 7 turns for
reflective players. 3-month/turn optional extension lengthens game
proportionately. Double-length player-turns doubles game-time.
Historicity: Satisfactory. Historical conditions and forces are fully
replicated at a general level.
Comparisons: More playable and historical than most comparable games.
Overall: A very intriguing and worthwhile addition to the roster of
Great Patriotic War/World War II Russian Front games.
Copyright 1996 Louis R. Coatney