From: "david f dimeo" Subject: Central America (VG) CENTRAL AMERICA: The United States' Backyard War (Victory Games, 1987) Review Intro: CENTAM won the Charles S. Rogers award in 1987, but has naturally suffered the effects of history - since the demise of the Sandinistas, there is little interest in what appeared to be "the next Vietnam" in the mid-1980s. This is unfortunate, because the game itself deserves to be remembered for its balance of detail and playability; and the difficulty of portraying "Low Instensity Conflict" /political insurgency. The subject is still a worthy one, IMO. DESERT STORM and the political defeat of the Sandinistas have done a lot to erase the sting of Vietnam, but our tactics and strategy for long-term Low Instensity Conflicts still remain a bone of contention. Ten years later, its still worth replaying what "might have been" in the jungle. Bottom Line: I picked this game up when I was a staff planner in one of the Army units depicted in the game. I felt that it very accurately portrays US Corps-level contingency operations (ala JUST CAUSE), but failed to depict a long duration unconventional war. Designed by James McQuaid, CENTAM is extremely impressive on first examination, but its flaws gradually emerge in the campaign games. Specs: The game covers the region from El Salvador to Costa Rica (15 mile hexes), with some historical scenarios (Fall of Somoza, etc) but mostly focuses on the Contra/Sandinista conflicts, including their allied guerrilla groups, foreign powers (the obvious US, USSR & Cuba, but even the Israeli Mossad, Libyans and various civilian groups associated with the CIA). Unit counters are US Battalions, Nicaraguan regiments and equivalents. A full game will generally involve about a US Corps-sized JTF vs. a simi lar size Communist force. Turns represent two days. There are 16 scenarios (7 are campaign length) from 1-8 hours in length. 780 very well crafted counters. The rules consist of three booklets (well-organized, detailed and clear): basic game, intervention game and an entire booklet for the scenarios. The map is the standard VG paper fold-out, with bright terrain colors - basically a lower quality than the rest of the game. Strengths: 1. Complexity vs. Playability. CENTAM, IMO, strikes the best balance between these two characteristics. The rules are extremely well-researched and very detailed, especially for the US units. At the same time, they are not cumbersome. The key is the distinction between rules that require a die roll or check every turn (or for every unit), versus rules which are situationally dependent. Consider the difference between this game and GULF STRIKE, both of which rate a 10 on the VG complexity scale and have rule books of similar lengths. GS requires a mind-numbing amount of checks and rolls so that turns drag on forever. CENTAM provides a large array of special weapons, units and events which are brought in only when necessary (from the War Powers Act, to chemical strikes, etc). The turn sequence is very long, but many steps in it are only used occasionally. 2. US Units. The capabilities and limitations of the US battalions are faithfully represented, both in the unit counters and the rules. Movement, logistics and combat differ substantially for parachute, airmobile, marine, armored and light units (for instance, 82nd Airborne's Air resupply points, USMC logistical beachheads). Air units run the gammut from B-52s and F16s with smart bombs, cluster munitions for conventional combat, to older prop-driven planes which have better ratings for counterinsurge ncy and infiltration. A few inaccuracies, common to many games (divisional air defense battalions and SF battalions deployed as a single unit counter), but they pose no major problem. By differentiating capabilities so well, CENTAM forces the Allied player to rely on joint and combined operations to have a chance of success. This represents real life contingency opns well. 3. Scenarios. While many games attempt to pass of minor set-up adjustments as "scenarios" (the 'Bonus Link-Up Scenario for Gulf Strike-Aegean Strike' comes to mind), Mr. McQuaid spares no expense in this area. One of the three game booklets is dedicated solely to scenarios, which include past conflicts as well as "future" ones. They are all distinct and detailed, and the 1 hour introductory scenarios are interesting, not just pieces of the bigger scenario. These include wars between Latin American nations, wars including the US, and some with the USSR. If that were not enough, there is a scenario generation system included to make your own. 4. Guerrilla factions. The game includes 23 countries and guerrilla factions, each with its own distinct counters. The historical notes, scenarios and glossary do a great job introducing each faction and when and where it fit into the overall conflict. As one who was always confused by the alphabet soup of political factions on the news (ARDE, FMLN, FSLN), going through the game gave me a better understanding of who was who. This does not mean that the capabilities or tactics of these factions are well reflected (see Weaknesses, below), just that you learn who they were. 5. Political Rules. This is both a strength and a weakness. Strength, because the designers made an obvious effort to include political limitations on military ops. The intervention rules (second of the three booklets) detail the effects of the War Powers Act, UN restrictions and different Soviet strategies (Brezhnev Doctrine, for example). The net effect on the player, who simulates an operational-level commander, is to force artificial timetables, restrictions on weapons and geographic limits. T he Communist will exploit these in a dirty fashion, much like the North Vietnamese. The weakness is that once these limits are set, the conventional firepower battle continues as normal. There is not much of a mechanism for simulating the battle for "hearts and minds." 6. Logistics/Intratheatre Transport. We all know supply is critical in combat, yet it is tedious to replicate in game play. James McQuaid has done a good job making the log play important, but not cumbersome. Units can trace supply lines to a city or port, in the traditional way, but special/guerilla units use counters representing temporary supply sources (these may be guerilla caches or airdroppable supplies for the 82d, seaborne resupply for the Marines). Additionally, moving airmobile units and keeping them resupplied requires careful use of transport like the C-130s or CH-47s, or older prop-driven trasnport. Since the game involves a lot of raids, airmobile and amphibious attacks to take out enemy base camps, the Allied player has to maneuver his log/transport units as well as combat forces. Same for guerillas planning a major operation. 7. Combined/Joint Operations. Again, Mr. McQuaid has done a good job injecting reality into the game in a playable manner. His combat system heavily rewards use of combined arms (air/helicopter/artillery/engineers/special forces) over pure strength. He has incorporated intelligence/EW support in a simple manner, giving detection and combat bonuses to US units fighting with support of CIA or AWACS. Simply massing strength points and attacking won't get you far in this game. Taking all these advantag es together, the game is strongest at replicating a multi-division level operation of short duration (like a JUST CAUSE operation against the Sandinistas). Typically, you must lead with an airborne attack by the 82nd, to secure a base within enemy territory; then start an intense air resupply and deployment to get other forces built up in the base, before the enemy can eliminate it; then you can open a second front from the coast with the Marines. The finale is to link up the heavy forces (1st Cav Divisio n in this game). It simulates a JTF commander given a green-light for a two or three month strike to eliminate the Communists and get out before it becomes a mess. As far as portraying anything longer and more subtle, it doesn't work. It doesn't really show 'another Vietnam,' rather, the it's the kind of operation Westmoreland would have loved to execute, but never could. 8. Presentation. The components are high-quality. The counters are attractive, detailed and have a good color system. The rules booklets are organized, written in plain English and include extensive examples (with pictures), definitions and design notes. The situationally dependent rules are packaged as such (special rules pertaining to the 82nd are in a separate section, you go to it when you use the 82nd, etc.) The map is a disappointment, however, being a bright-colored, paper foldout with less detail than the rest of the game. Weaknesses: 1. Combat Resolution. CENTAM is great for planning and executing operations; combat resolution is disappointing. The damage system allows for either destruction of a unit, or step loss (flipping it over to half strength). This might work for a conventional European style battle, but not for this kind of war. Problem is that a US infantry battalion either gets cut to half strength, wiped out or takes no losses. This doesn't depict the slow attrition that is characteristic of Low Intensity Conflict and its political effects back home. The losses that the US Rangers suffered in Somalia, for instance, would be a "no effect" on this table. A Hit point system (as in Aegean Strike) might be better. Additionally, the system allows for step losses on infantry units from air strikes. Again, maybe in Europe, not in a jungle/guerrilla war. The CRT awards column shifts for terrain and support units (a strength above), but this miminizes the role of infantry strength points too much . In a jungle war, artill ery and air strikes can do so much, but the light infantry must inevitably win the fight. 2. Communist Units. The detailed design used on the US units does not carry over to the Nicaraguan and guerilla forces. Basically, they play like weak, regular infantry units. Insurgent units are included, but other than better movement capabilities, reconstitution and different placement rules, they don't alter the battle significantly. This is where the game falls down, IMO. Despite all the special political rules, scenarios end up being a conventional fight against Nicaraguan cannon fodder. Th e player is only limited on how long he gets to kill them and with what weapons. In fairness, this is not a design flaw as much as a reflection of how difficult insurgency is to represent. The US Army has not been able to find a suitable exercise or simulation that puts the notorious "eight year old kid with a hand grenade" as the focus, either. A partial solution may be to include some terrorist squads, which can be negated by security/patrolling, and give their attacks gre ater weight on the victory poi nt scale. Points for insurgent sabotage/intimindation/propaganda ops could also be included. 3. Security Operations. As mentioned, the game is good for short, big, conventional strikes. It does not replicate long-term security missions, like peacekeeping, counter-insurgency, etc, that are still so confusing. US battalions deployed in CENTAM are useful mostly for conventional attacks, there is no mechanism for the firebases of Vietnam fame, or a better alternative to those firebases. This could be fixed by including a patrolling mission and table (as in VG's VIETNAM). Units do have Zones of Control, but they are the same as ZOCs in a conventional game. For light infantry battalions, patrolling the adjacent six hexes against infilitrators and subversives would be a full-time mission. Tie this to the political rules (e.g. an air strike in the province makes the locals angry, giving you a -1 on your patrolling rolls). Likewise, the longer the unit stays in one place, the better it gets at patrolling - pull it out for a few turns and it loses credibility when it returns ( reflecting the negat ive effect of US patrols that sweep an area every few weeks then turn the locals back over to the bad guys). With such a mission included in the game, the US player would have to carefully balance his need for local security with big multi-unit operations. Conclusion: CENTAM is a good game, worth buying and playing. An ambitious player could use it as a base - design your own map and modify some enemy counters, use the system to simulate a major US contingency operation in another remote part of the world. Since the game's strength is in depicting the US force (not the enemy), it would not lose much if adapted for Africa, Haiti, the Balkans or someplace else.