David Buckland - 09:02pm Jul 21, 2000 PST (#2616 of 2617)

Someone asked a little while back about the Verdun game in S&T 198. I
had held off buying the earlier instalments of DG’s Over the Top series
­ S&T 186 (Mons and the Marne), and Over the Top itself (Riga, Damascus,
Brusilov Offensive, & St. Mihiel) ­ for a variety of reasons. Three of
the battles in the boxed game seemed too one-sided to be interesting
(all except Brusilov, and even then the Austrians were on a hiding to
nothing), while the earlier S&T games were reported to have significant
problems (especially the Marne). S&T 198, however, has the attractive
combination of a little-gamed Eastern Front battle (Lemberg), and one of
the key battles of the war, Verdun. Of the two, I have only played, and
can therefore only comment on, Verdun.

The game is at regimental scale, one mile to the hex, and covers the
area on both sides of the Meuse where the battle was fought. While the
map is the usual attractive Joe Youst effort, a first nit to pick is the
amount of it devoted to the German side of the front line, which will,
as the Germans are attacking, be so much waste space. Then there is the
suppression of French accents in place-names: Béthincourt becoming
Bethincourt, for example ­ a small point, but indicative of a relaxed
attitude to the historical background.

The victory conditions give a nod to both Falkenhayn’s supposed
objective of bleeding the French white, and 5th Army’s desire to take
Verdun itself. A German Tactical Victory results from capturing the
city, while a Marginal Victory stems from the destruction of 20 French
units. A Decisive Victory needs the Germans to have achieved both of
these objectives (the French victory conditions are a mirror image of
these, ie. hold Verdun, destroy 20 German units, etc.).

The game covers the first 15 days (one turn per day) of Operation
Gericht (the German attack), though it can optionally be extended for a
further 10 days. And here another problem looms. Historically, the
Germans did not get near capturing the city ­ certainly the French
feared they would lose it, but in reality the German advance was stopped
well short. So, of the two German victory conditions, one was never
realised, and was only a possibility, at best. In relation to the other,
it is difficult to be sure, but, given that both sides casualties tend
to be concentrated in their infantry units, and the French have only 30,
the loss of 20 would seem fairly devastating, even if some of these
losses were HQs or artillery units. I estimate the line the French
actually held at the German high water mark during this initial stage of
the battle as 28 hexes, and even with rigid ZOCs (which could be
questioned in a WWI game at this scale), a French force reduced this far
would have little chance of holding such a line.

What all this implies is that here we have a game where ­ if the Victory
Conditions are an indication of the designer’s intent ­ the historical
advance is unlikely, and the chance of German progress being at least
roughly analogous to what they in fact achieved is very slim. Instead,
the Germans stand a reasonable chance of both taking Verdun, and
destroying the French army defending it.

The set-up and command rules lead to further problems in making possible
a recreation the historical battle. Command plays an important part in
the game. Each unit is colour-coded for the corps to which it belongs
(except for a limited number of army-level units), and these must be
within two hexes of their HQ to remain in command. If they are not, then
they suffer combat penalties (two adverse shifts if attacking, one if
defending), and may not move in the Breakthrough Movement Phase. HQs
move only two hexes per turn, while infantry can move 6 (German) or 5
(French) MPs, not to mention the ability to move up to half their MPs
again in the Breakthrough Phase. This can rightly make sweeping advances
more difficult, as the spearhead units lose touch with their HQ.

However, a more important effect, especially at the beginning of the
game, is the fact that the Germans have 8 HQs to the French 3. Given
that EZOCs cut command, the best command span an HQ is likely to have is
3 hexes of front line ­ and even then, this assumes that good defensive
terrain will be available for the HQ, in the position it needs to occupy
so that it can maximise its command span. Sadly, this is often not the
case, and leaving a corps HQ in the open invites an artillery
bombardment to disrupt it, which is something to be avoided if at all
possible. In any event, the French start the game with 44 trench hexes
to defend, only 9 or so of which will be held by in command units. The
obvious German tactic is to spread out their initial assault, so that
most sectors of the French line are attacked, many of which are going to
be out of command.

The issue here is that, for reasons connected with his limited aims,
Falkenhayn has been attributed much of the blame for the decision to
limit the initial German attacks to only the eastern bank of the Meuse ­
attacks on the western bank did not begin until 6th March, the final
turn of the basic game. In addition, the Germans appear to have attacked
at first with only 3 of the 8 corps they have to hand at the start of
the S&T version. The game gives the German player no incentive to
exercise such restraint ­ no VP penalty for attacking along the whole
line at once, for example ­ with the not too surprising result that the
Germans make much better progress than they did in the real battle.

Then there is the issue of the forts with which the French had ringed
Verdun. The game takes the view that these were major strongpoints.
Although they have an intrinsic defence of only 2, they can be very
difficult to take. Indeed, the French player is best advised in many
cases not to add his precious infantry to the defence of his forts, but
let them take the brunt of the German attack directly. This is because,
if I have read the rules correctly (and I admit that I may be mistaken
here), an assault on a fort cannot exceed 5-to-1 odds (the maximum
7-to-1, shifted two columns to the right because the attack is against a
fort). Only a DE or DZ result will destroy the fort, and this is only a
1-in-3 chance at these odds (admittedly better if the Germans throw in
one of their two shock units, in which case the odds do rise to 2-in-3).
At these same odds, infantry supposedly aiding the defence would be sure
to suffer at least one step loss (DA or EX result) ­ hence they are
often better off out of it. The forts can also be destroyed by artillery
fire, but it takes a substantial concentration to have any effect:
concentrating 60% of the 5th Army’s artillery would yield a 50:50 chance
of destroying the targeted fort. As there are a lot of these forts, and
they project ZOCs until they are destroyed, it can take the German some
time to wade through them all. A standard French tactic at some point in
the game is therefore to pull back to the fort line protecting the
centre of their line, and try to recuperate while the Germans slowly
batter their way through.

Whether this is the historical picture is at the very least
questionable. Firstly, and going back to the previous point about actual
versus game German progress, only one fort, Douaumont, fell during this
initial period (the second taken by the Germans, Vaux, fell in June).
Douaumont was captured with remarkable ease, mainly because the French
were not really trying to defend it ­ or indeed any of the other forts,
having decided that they were museum pieces. Later, Petain changed this,
and certainly the fight for Fort Vaux was both prolonged and bitter.
However, even later in the battle, it was a moot point how useful the
forts were, and much of the fighting surrounding them had to do with
their prestige or morale value, rather than any intrinsic military
worth. Certainly, the use to which the French are likely to put their
forts in the game seems ahistorical.

I am also dubious about the fact that neither side receives any
reinforcements during the game. I have no detailed sources to be able to
check this, but remain suspicious about the lack of French
reinforcements, particularly after Petain took command (on 26th
February).

Lastly, there are the linked issues of supply and the map. Since the
Germans are likely to make more progress than they did historically,
while some of 5th Army hacks its way towards Verdun through the French
forts in the centre, other forces can find it well worth their while to
begin threatening the two main French supply lines. One of these is the
famous Sacred Way, west of the Meuse. The other is the railway line and
road running through Dieue, further east along the banks of the river.
One possible German plan is to launch a gigantic pincer attack: the
western arm starting near Avocourt, then heading through Dombasie and
Rampont towards the Sacred Way at Vadelaincourt. The French will find it
difficult to defend here after their initial trench line is broken, as
there are few obvious lines of defence, and their forces are likely to
be stretched to the limit. The eastern arm could start from Woevre, and
head directly south to the Meuse at Dieue, causing somewhat similar
problems for the French, though there are some helpful ridgelines for
the defence.

(contd.)

David Buckland - 09:06pm Jul 21, 2000 PST (#2617 of 2617)
S&T # 198 Over the Top: Verdun (Part 2)

So why did the Germans not try this historically, rather than the
unimaginative frontal assault on the centre of the French position? This
might, of course, have been due to Teutonic stolidity, but there do seem
good reasons why it was not attempted. The 5th Army may not have
launched an assault as far west as Avocourt because immediately behind
the French trench lines in this sector lay the extensive Forest of
Hesse, which seems to have disappeared from the DG map. And the road and
rail supply lines via Dieue? These ran towards the German salient and
St. Mihiel, and therefore could not be used to supply the defenders of
Verdun ­ which is why the Sacred Way was such a vital supply line for
the French. So the pincer movement, which seems to make sense in the
game, would have faced greater obstacles in the west, and had much
further to go in the east, in the real world of 1916, which is perhaps
why the Germans did not try it.

All told then, I think that there are some significant question marks
over the ability of this game to recreate in game terms what happened
historically. That a game offers alternatives to what actually took
place is very right and proper. The Germans should perhaps have a chance
to take the city, or crush the defenders (or even both) ­ but it should
probably be no more than a chance, and probably a slim one. But that the
historical course of events looks extremely unlikely is a black mark, at
least in my book. The French resistance is underestimated ­ or the
Germans given too easy a time of it. This could be addressed in part by
changing the replacement rates in the game, especially increasing the
French totals, but then this would need other changes, such as
introducing more detailed, less cataclysmic, victory conditions.

Perhaps, as has been suggested before, Verdun would be a good candidate
for the area/impulse games which started with Storm Over Arnhem, and
were recently successfully brought to the Western Front by Ted Raicer’s
game RTC (on Cambrai). Certainly this system seems to do a good job of
making attrition battles into interesting games. Meanwhile, if you are
looking for a WWI battle game at this level, with roughly the same
complexity and length, then I would recommend the La Matz game from Vae
Victis #24. Same opponents (Germans attacking Frenchmen), same war
(though a little later ­ 1918) but a much better reflection of what
might have occurred, and a better game, in that the French ­ on the
defensive originally ­ will get an opportunity to counterattack.