Morale From a Campaign Perspective By Brian Ross `Battle is a harrowing business. In addition to the physical risks of death or injury, the soldier is subjected to the intense psychological pressures generated by exhaustion, privation, noise, worries about families and friends, and the sight of comrades being killed and wounded.`(1) As wargamers we are all too aware of the effect that morale can have on how a battle is conducted. However, how many of us ever consider what effect the outcome of the previous battle could have had on our troops? There are no rules for any period, to my knowledge which considers the larger, overall picture. To the rules maker, each battle seems to happen in a vacuum. To them, and to many wargamers it matters not how this particular battle has come about, rather it is simply an afternoon's fun, which is fought without consideration of its effects on the army or nation as a whole. However, as the SASA has now gotten away from that sort of English style of gaming and more into consideration of the campaign as the norm, rather than the exception, its time I feel that we started to consider what effect long term and sustained campaigning can have on an army. If we don't, then all we are doing is fighting a series of one-off battles rather than an actual campaign. Military thinkers for centuries have recognised the importance of morale. Xenophon declared, `You know, I am sure, that no numbers or strength can bring about victory in war; but whichever army goes into battle stronger in soul, their enemies cannot withstand them.'(2) Clausewitz compared the physical and moral components to the parts of a sword. `One might say that the physical seems little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely honed blade.'(3) This though, does not ignore that without a hilt (the physical forces) even the best honed sword of the sharpest blade is quite useless. While for Napoleon there was the dictum that `Moral is to the material as is three is to one', which meant that for him, it was not necessarily material factors which won his battles but the morale of his troops and their ability to withstand the casualties they had sustained. While Field Marshal Montgomery maintained that, `The morale of the soldier is the greatest single factor in war.'(4) Military moral is, as Eric Bergerud suggests in his book, Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning, an, `extraordinarily multifaceted subject.`(5) Depending upon the period and even the campaign morale can be effected by something as relatively trivial as the quality of food or something for the soldier that is as emotionally shattering as the loss of a friend or in some ancient armies a lover. However, as the Comte de Guibert, pointed out in the eighteenth century, `Personal bravery of a single individual does not decide on the day of battle, but the bravery of the unit, and the latter rests on the good opinion and the confidence that each individual places in the unit to which he belongs.'(6) While the former of the two examples is more the sort of thing which we are concerned with at the unit level rather than the latter it is important to understand that even at this level it is quite often the small, personal factors which determine the outcome of morale and hence the battle. Consequently, attempting to formulate a set of general rules which covers all periods is a precarious exercise. Examples of variables which have to be taken into account in such a system would have to include leadership. Afterall, a well-led unit, even if continually defeated is much better equipped to bounce back than one which is poorly led. However here is a potential for misunderstanding. Why? Because this sort of consideration would have to be based upon how the umpire judged the performance of not only the players, as the unit commanders, as well as what sort of attributes the particular scenario the umpire has given to the characters they are being asked to play. It might therefore be more diplomatic if the umpire only supplies the campaign morale rating of the troops rather than his analysis of the players' leadership ability(if he wants to retain what few friends he has, that is). Another factor, and perhaps one of the most important, would have to be the performance of the unit in battle. Even if it manages to achieve its objectives but does so at some cost to itself, there is a high chance that it could be unwilling to continue the pursuit of the enemy. Conversely, if they are able to shatter their opponent at little cost, that unit is temporarily living the best of both worlds. In addition, for many aspects of morale, timing is important. In every war, morale is most often at its peak at the beginning of a war or campaign before realities have had a chance to sink in. As Thucydides reminds us, `war is a stern master.`(7) Violence over time transforms the psychological chemistry of any army. Naivet‚ concerning the outcome of combat is the first casualty. Political will or morale, unless it deals with an absolutely clear case of national extinction, will likewise change as the soldier begins to question the reasons why he/she is fighting. Which brings us to an even more difficult factor, which is that of the `moral` force is warfare. This was considered by many of the writers in the later half of the last century to be the most important factor in warfare. Essentially it equates to the idea that a military force will be able to force its will upon an enemy and hence decide a battle or campaign by being able, despite even appalling casualties to seize control of the initiative and hence the battlefield. As a consequence of the teachings of General Mikhail Dragomirov,(8) a prominent Russian General of the Russo- Turkish War and the Frenchman Ardent du Picq(9) and similar teachings, inspiration was provided for the French School of the Offensive a outrance.(10) This group, known collectively as the Young Turks and lead by Ferdinand Foch, Francois Grandmaison and Noel de Castelnau, based their theories upon studies of not only these theorists, but also illustrated it with examples from the Grand Armee. They believed in mass, the offence, and the ability of motivated troops to penetrate the extended fronts of modern battlefields. From their study of the history of warfare, the Young Turks concluded that the laurels of victory invariably fell to the attacker. One must, therefore, attack, even if the losses were severe.(11) While fine in theory, when the theorists encountered the reality of the modern battlefield in August 1914, they discovered that their and du Picq's misreading of Clausewitz, which had ignored the existence of the shock and the physical impulse, which is in fact so much a part of Clausewitz's theories, was wrong. No amount of elan and mass was going to defeat firepower able to inflict horrendous casualties upon the attacker who was foolish enough to charge entrenched troops and machine guns across open ground. Despite this though, a lack of understanding the `moral aspect` in warfare has undone more commanders than can be mentioned in this brief article. However, whereas, the Offensive a outrance believed it was the moral aspect of war which caused the defeat of one's opponent in warfare, most strategists understand now that it is in fact the physical aspects of battle, the overwhelming firepower, the outmanoeuvring of your enemy which create the conditions for the moral aspect to come into play. Despite that, the effect of an enemy which does steadily and grimly advance, in spite of all that is thrown against them by the defenders cannot be overlooked. As the Argentinians in the Falklands found to their cost. So in considering these sorts of factors in creating some system campaign morale will be difficult but not necessarily impossible. It is my proposal that before the beginning of a campaign the umpire should assign, based upon his knowledge of the players, commanders and units involved, an overall morale rating. This rating would then be modified upon the basis of events as they occur during the course of the campaign. This in turn would determine the morale rating of the troops before they go into battle and help decide as to whether or not they will stand up to the rigours of the conflict surrounding them. Essentially it would be based around a base 100 system. Each unit (the size varying, depending upon the campaign, but in most of the SASA's sized campaigns the Battalion or even as small as the Company would be the ideal starting point, in my opinion) would have their score modified by the following factors to have a resultant pre-campaign score. This would then be modified according to events and the umpire's judgement as the campaign progressed. The score could then, according to the scale at the end of the article be used to modify battle morale results (in a general +/- way, varying depending upon period and rules used) as well as helping the umpire to determine the condition of the units' morale and their ability to perform the tasks ordered by the players during their campaign moves. The result I hope would be that players would have to start taking into account many more realistic factors in their campaign plans than they have up to date. However both umpires and players should be aware that these are only a suggestion and should be modified by the particular period/campaign being played. Morale Factors Table Unit's Base Value Unit is Enslaved 5 Militia 10 Conscript 30 Volunteer 50 Modifiers to Unit's Base Value Unit is Completely untrained - 15 Semi-trained -5 Well-trained +5 Untried in combat -5 Veteran (survived at least one battle) +5 Politically/Religiously motivated (ie +5 SS/Brownshirts/etc) Mercenary -1 Elite (ie Old Guard/Paratroopers/etc) +5 Commander's Ineffectual/Inefficient - character is 15 Efficient +1 Very efficient +5 a Martinet +1 Aggressive -1 Uncaring -1 Indecisive -1 Unit's owning Ineffectual/Inefficient -1 player is 5 Efficient +1 Very efficient +5 Aggressive -1 Uncaring -1 Indecisive -1 Time Factors Start of war/New Campaign +1 Mid-point in war/Campaign -1 Towards end of war/Campaign -1 Unit's Supply system is well organised/managed +1 Supplies are sufficient for the +1 campaign Medical system is well +1 organised/efficient Supply system is -1 disorganised/mismanaged Supplies are insufficient for the -1 campaign Medical system is -1 unorganised/inefficient Unit's army is on the defensive -1 army on the offensive +1 Unit is defending their +1 homeland/city/town/village/etc. facing a weaker opponent +1 facing a stronger opponent -1 facing a well led opposition -1 retreating -1 routing - 10 advancing +1 pursuing a routed enemy +1 0 Campaign is during winter - conducted 10 during spring +1 during summer (except in tropical +5 areas) during autumn -1 Ongoing Campaign Factors which modify the units' morale Unit has Lost 1% of its strength in last -1 engagement Lost 1-5% of its strength in last -5 engagement Lost >5% in last engagement - 10 Killed 1% of its opponents in last +1 engagement Killed 1-5% of its opponents +5 Killed >5% of its opponents +1 0 Run out of supplies - 10 Under constant harassment from enemy -5 cavalry/aircraft Under constant artillery bombardment -5 Is besieged/Surrounded -5 Has just done a withdrawal/retreat move -1 Each successive withdrawal/retreat move - done before this turn .25 Has had hot food supplied to it in the +1 last 24 hours Is defending prepared positions +5 Has had a rest move (ie not moved +1 during campaign phase) Weather for each campaign turn of rain/snow -1 for each campaign turn of thaw -1 for each campaign turn of excessive -1 heat ( > 40) for each campaign turn of excessive -1 humidity (> 80%) Terrain is Mud/Slush/Mountainous -1 Desert/Jungle -1 Urban -1 Morale Effects Table Morale Score Effect 100+ Will follow their commander anywhere, undertake any task. Will attempt to accomplish the impossible without hesitation. Cannot fail their first morale roll in a battle. Get a plus to all other rolls until at least 50% casualties are suffered. Campaign moves are multiplied by 125%. 81-100 Will obey all orders. Must still undertake all morale rolls in battle. Gets a plus until 25% casualties suffered. 51-80 Will carry out orders. Must undertake all morale rolls in battle. Receives a plus until first casualties suffered. 31-50 Will carry out orders. Must undertake all morale rolls in battle without modification. 20-30 Hesitates before carrying out orders. Will take one extra battle turn to carry out an advance on the battlefield. Must undertake all morale rolls in battle. Receives a minus once first casualties suffered. 0-19 Hesitates before carrying out orders. Must undertake all morale rolls in battle with an automatic minus. Will take two extra battle turns to carry out advance orders on the battlefield. Will always be last on the march during a campaign. Campaign moves are reduced to 75% of normal < 0 Refuses to carry out orders. Will break on the first morale roll in battle. _______________________________ ENDNOTES 1)p.39, Keegan, J., &, Holmes, R., Soldiers, a history of men in battle, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1985. 2)quoted, ibid. 3)p.75, von Clausewitz, C., On War, (Trans. & Edited by Howard, M., Paret, P.,), Princeton University Press, 1976. 4)quoted, p.39, Keegan, et.al. 5) p.261, Bergerud, E.M., Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning - The World of a Combat Division in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1993. 6)quoted, p.46, Keegan, et.al. 7)quoted, ibid. 8)Pinter, W., `Russian Military Thought: The Western Model and the Shadow of Suvorov', in Paret, P. (Ed.), The Makers of Modern Strategy; from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986). 9)du Picq, A., Battle Studies, (trans. Greely, J.N., &, Cotton, R.C., Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, Pa., 1946). 10)Possony, S.T., &, Mantoux, S., `du Picq and Foch: The French School', in (Earle, E.M. (Ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy, Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, 1943). 11)Arnold, J.C., `French Tactical Doctrine 1870-1914', (Military Affairs, April 1978).