Profile: Soviet Airborne

The Strategic Guerillas

This is the first of an occasional series by Sam Marks which will
briefly look at a wide variety of subjects ranging from weapon systems
to tactical doctrine.

The airborne forces of the USSR are an elite formation, like most other
similar formations elsewhere in the world, and they are made up of
hand-picked conscripts and regulars drawn from all branches of the
Soviet Army. Many will have had previous parachute experience from
sporting and club activities. Their training programme is exceptionally
tough and explicit.

It is important to note that in terms of the tactical doctrine behind
their training the Soviet High Command does not distinguish between its
air borne forces and its similar naval "assault" forces. The basic
concept of the various air/sea assault operations is not in anyway
determined by the means of transport involved. Indeed, the concept dates
back far into Soviet military history and initially could only be
carried out by sea. By 1920 however, aircraft became available that made
it possible to land or paradrop considerable numbers of troops and
equipment.

The USSR was one of the first nations to recognise the potential of
air-transported troops and held the first large scale exercise as far
back as the early 1930's. Their first large scale heli-borne landings
were demonstrated, using upwards of one hundred helicopters, in
exercises in 1956. Strangely though, the Soviets seemed less ready to
adopt the use of helicopters in the way that the Americans did with
their Airmobile Units. This is probably due to the cost of the machines
and their relative vulnerability, in the European theatre, to a possible
tactical nuclear counter-strike against any such concentration of
helicopters.

During WWII a number of tactical assaults were carried out, those made 
by naval forces being, in the main, the more successful. This may have 
been a result of a general lack of specialised equipment for airborne 
operations and the very high standard and length of training required. 
The Eastern front wasn't too fussy about what sort of troops it chewed 
up iust so long as there were plenty of them.

In recent years, however, the USSR has been to enormous lengths to
train, develop and equip its airborne units. Modern technology has not
appreciably altered the concept of their use but has simply provided
newer alternatives to its means of implementation.

There are reckoned to be 7/8 Airborne Divisions available now, all based
deep inside the Soviet Union rather than deployed with their Warsaw Pact
Allies in and around Germany. All these units are trained and
combat-ready to carry out a number of roles and play an important part
in modern Soviet military theory. The task that they are primarily
trained to carry out involves a concept that does not appear to have a
direct equivalent in western theory.

Not only are they for use as adjuncts to a large scale operation but
they are also trained for use in strategic defense, when no other means
are available. They deploy with considerable speed and complete secrecy
to obtain the all-important element of surprise. They represent the most
effective use of resources available and require an enemy to deploy far
greater forces, out of all proportion, to counter the possible attack in
the rear or flank. They could almost be described as strategic
guerillas! The Russians place great strength in their ability to cause
the maximum confusion when fighting in the rear area, and the subsequent
lowering of enemy morale.

As with most airborne forces in the world they are trained in the
traditional airborne role of landing by parachute, helicopter or plane
to fight behind enemy lines to assist the main ground forces' advance.
In Soviet theory there is no size limit to this type of operation. Three
or four divisions might be deployed. In fact, the still severe
limitations of transport aircraft availability and the possibility of a
tactical nuclear counter-strike make it very unlikely that more than a
battalion-group would be deployed at one time. Many NATO experts think
that the USSR only has sufficient transport capability to move one
division at a time, and even with mobilisation of the entire civil air
fleet it could only just lift a second. In this traditional deployment,
air superiority is not only necessary it is vital to the success of the
operation. The enemy's air defense and tactical nuclear capability would
have to be neutralised by ECM, missile strikes or small scale landings
before attempting this major deployment.

In line with most western equivalents the Soviet airborne units are also
trained to operate in small, platoon-sized, groups, landing by the most
advanced parachuting techniques to undertake reconnaisance, pathfinder
or sabotage missions. These units would be flown in by a single,
probably unaccompanied, plane to land silently and with orders to avoid
confrontation until their mission was completed. They would probably lie
low until relieved by advancing ground forces, or possibly be airlifted
out by helicopter.

The use of airborne units to prevent enemy reinforcements moving up is
also part of the Soviet doctrine. Here small units would be dropped on a
broad front to create a large number of combat areas, causing maximum
confusion to units already engaged as well as those trying to move up to
deploy.

Perhaps the most unusual deployment of Soviet airborne forces is in the
strategic sense and would be undertaken by battalion-sized "suicide"
groups whose task would be to destroy or negate targets of strategic
importance, such as communications centres or government buildings, or
even the assassination of a political figure-head, deep inside enemy
territory. These long range strike groups would not have the means to
extricate themselves after accomplishing their mission and are, in
military terms, 'expendable'. It is a hard fact of Soviet life that it
is worth the certainty of losing 2/300 men to achieve a mission of such
strategic importance.

Tactical doctrine dictates that the time between an airborne assault and
a preceding nuclear, chemical or conventional strike should be the
minimum possible, and, according to the military textbook is best
carried out in the hours of darkness so as to fully exploit the surprise
element.

The theory is - quick, small, unexpected strikes at night will achieve
far more than a large daylight operation that the enemy can pinpoint,
assess and counter-attack. All the problems involved in night time
operations are considered to be outweighed by the advantages of surprise
and the 'cloak of darkness'.

The Soviets believe that the most effective assault on a given objective
is a simultaneous two-pronged surprise attack at night. This kind of
operation requires the highest possible training to avoid the real
possibility of the two prongs destroying each other! If such an
operation can not be mounted it is then considered necessary to organise
a diversionary attack to confuse the enemy.

All in all, the Soviet airborne forces represent an important element in
the USSR's armed forces in both the tactical and strategic strength.
Though their fundemental role is one of supporting the main ground
forces, they do undoubtedly represent an element in the High Command's
Reserve that is capable of immense strategic value.